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ABSTRACT 
AN OTTOMAN PEACE ATTEMPT AT THE HABSBURG COURT 
DURING THE OTTOMAN-HOLY LEAGUE WAR: ZÜLFIKÂR EFENDI 
IN VIENNA, 1688-1693 
 
Yılmaz, Yasir 
M.A., Department of History 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Halil Đnalcık 
January 2008 
 
The visit of Zülfikar Efendi to the Habsburg court in 1688 was a milestone in 
Ottoman diplomatic history. The Ottoman system had its own diplomatic means and 
manners for centuries preceding the 1680s but these methods would function 
effectively only as long as the Ottomans were strong enough to ignore the strength of 
their rivals. An empire which for centuries had practiced unilateral and non-
reciprocal policy making and implementation in diplomatic affairs was now seeking 
peace at the court of the Habsburgs, while welcoming Anglo-Dutch mediation.  
This peace attempt marked the beginning of a new era for the Ottomans. From 
then on, they started considering the diplomatic rules and procedures followed by the 
European states in international arena, while this also marked the beginning of 
Ottomans’ gradual acceptance of European means and manners in many other issues. 
Key Words: Zülfikar Efendi, Ottoman Empire, Diplomacy, Habsburg Empire, 
Leopold I, Louis XIV, Poland, Venice, Seventeenth century, Europe. 
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ÖZET 
OSMANLI-KUTSAL LĐG SAVAŞI ESNASINDA BĐR OSMANLI BARIŞ 
GĐRĐŞĐMĐ: ZÜLFĐKAR EFENDĐ VĐYANA’DA: 1688-1692 
 
Yılmaz, Yasir 
M.A., Tarih Bölümü 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Halil Đnalcık 
Ocak 2008 
 
Zülfikar Efendi’nin Habsburg sarayına 1688’de gerçekleştirdiği ziyaret 
Osmanlı diplomasi tarihinde bir dönüm noktasıydı. 1680ler öncesinde Osmanlı 
sisteminin bir takım kendi diplomatik yol ve yordamları vardı fakat bu metodlar 
ancak Osmanlılar rakiplerinin güçlerini önemsemeyecek kudrette oldukları sürece 
efektif olarak işleyebilirdi. Diplomatik meselelerde yıllarca tek taraflı ve karşılıksız 
bir siyaset mekanizması takip eden imparatorluk, şimdi Habsburg sarayında barış 
aramakla kalmıyor, Đngiliz ve Felemenk aracılığını da hoş karşılıyordu. 
Bu barış girişimi Osmanlılar için yeni bir dönemin başlangıcını simgeledi. O 
andan itibaren Sultanlar uluslararası arenada Avrupa devletleri tarafından takip 
edilen diplomatik kural ve prosedürleri dikkate almaya başladıkları gibi, bu aynı 
zamanda Osmanlıların diğer birçok konuda da Avrupanın usul ve prosedürlerini 
tedricen kabulünün başlangıcı oldu. 
 v 
Key Words: Zülfikar Efendi, Ottoman Đmparatorluğu, Diplomasi, Habsburg 
Đmparatorluğu, Leopold I, Louis XIV, Polonya, Venedik, Diplomacy, Onyedinci 
Yüzyıl, Avrupa. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In the late 1670s and early 1680s, an Ottoman campaign into Central Europe was 
predictable and highly expected. In 1669, Ottomans had finally captured Candia 
(Heraklion) at Crete from the Venetians, after more than a twenty years long siege. 
During the following decade the Sultan’s troops conducted new campaigns into 
their northern borders in Europe, aiming at conquest of the Polish King’s southern 
possessions in Ukraine. At the treaties signed with the Poles in 1672 
(Bucaş/Buczacz) and 1676 (Zurawno), the Ottomans secured acquisition of Podolia 
and Kamaniçe (Kamianetz).  
With these two last attempts to restore their authority in the Mediterranean and 
Central Europe, Ottomans seemed to have fulfilled their strategic goals at that time. 
But Kara Mustafa Pasha’s rise to the post of Grand Vizier in 1676 altered the vision 
of the Empire in the region. Since the Peace Treaty of Vasvar in 1664, where the 
Ottomans left the peace table as the gainful side although they lost the preceding 
battle in 1663 at St. Gotthard, Ottoman-Habsburg border in Hungary was 
overwhelmed by an anti-Habsburg nationalist movement. It was launched by 
Hungarian Protestants and Calvinists under the leadership of Imre Thököly. This 
malcontent community tried to approach to the Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmet Pasha 
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(1661-1676) to take his support. Fazil Ahmet Pasha, the commander of the army 
that lost the battle at St. Gotthard in 1663, had seen the territorial limits to the 
Ottoman central mechanism’s area of influence, and therefore, did not intervene 
with the situation. But his successor Kara Mustafa Pasha, who was planning a 
glorious campaign to Vienna to increase his fame, did not hesitate to support the 
Hungarian malcontents. He not only disregarded the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I’s 
(1658-1705) cooperation proposals in Hungary but also turned down the peace 
renewal request in 1681, when Leopold’s envoy visited Istanbul. 
Kara Mustafa Pasha laid siege on Vienna in 1683. It ended with heavy loss for 
the Ottomans. In 1684, owing much to the efforts of Pope Innocent XI (1676-1689), 
Leopold I signed an alliance treaty with the Venetians and Poles, and formed the 
Holy League against the Ottomans. The League, which was “little more than a 
coalition of recent victims of Ottoman resurgence”1 in the Mediterranean and 
Central Europe, launched a grand attack over Ottoman territories from three 
quarters: Habsburgs marched from upper and northern Hungary as well as from 
Croatia; Venetians set their sights on recapturing Mora (Morea) while also 
advancing into Herzegovina from around Ragusa and Poles started conducting 
campaigns to regain Podolia and Kamaniçe.  
During the first four years of the war until 1688/1689, the Holy League 
continuously drove back the Ottoman armies, except the northern front in Podolia, 
where the success of the Ottoman armies consisted of stopping the advance of the 
Polish forces, thanks to the efforts of the Crimean Khan there. At Habsburg and 
Venetian fronts the situation exacerbated so badly that one would expect a total 
breakdown of the Ottoman administration in the European provinces at the end of 
                                                 
1
 Charles Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy 1618-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 83. 
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the 1680s. Moreover, despite the loss of their one and a half century long 
possessions in Europe Ottomans were by no means showing signs of recovery. 
During 1686/1687 Habsburg armies had advanced into Serbia and Bosnian border 
almost without fighting. Meanwhile, at the Ottoman capital Sultan Mehmed IV 
(1648-1687) was dethroned and replaced with Süleyman III (1687-1691), Mehmed 
IV’s brother. 
The Ottoman Empire, which is known for its unilateral and non-reciprocal 
stance in the intermonarchial arena of the early modern world, decided dispatching 
a peace envoy to Vienna in 1688, on the pretext of reporting the new Sultan’s rise to 
the Ottoman throne. Indeed, couriers were sent to all over the world to report the 
ascension of Süleyman III, including Yemen, India, Persia, France, England, and 
the Dutch Republic.2 But as it was discovered soon, the envoy sent to Vienna was in 
fact a peace seeker disguised as a reporter of the new Sultan’s ascension. 
The palace first charged the chief treasurer (baş-muhâsebeci) Hamdi Efendi to 
go to Vienna. Hamdi Efendi replied that he couldn’t cope with the situation and was 
ready to suffer the consequences for disobeying the order of the Sultan. His 
punishment was death. 3 Then the Palace gave the duty of representing the Ottoman 
Sultan at the court of Leopold to Zülfikar, the deputy chief Imperial scribe (reis’ul-
küttab vekili). 
Zülfikar grew up in Privy Council (Hasoda). He became the chief of the 
Imperial corps in 1669 and was discharged later to become first the Head of the 
Doorkeepers (kapıcıbaşı) of the Palace and then chief officer responsible for the 
record of daily expenditures (ruzname-i evvel). Afterwards he was given the rank of 
                                                 
2
 Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde-i Vekayiât, Abdülkadir Özcan (ed.) (Ankara: Türk Tarih 
Kurumu, 1995), 292. 
3
 “Ben bu kâr-ı düşvârın ´uhdesinden gelemem. Câ’iz ki, encâmında ´itaba mazhar olam.” Defterdar 
Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde, 292. 
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Sultan’s inscriber (nişancı) and became deputy chief Imperial scribe.4 The sources 
put forth that before he was dispatched to Vienna, Zülfikar was given the rank of 
‘Pasha’ and ‘Beylerbeyi of Rumelia.’5 Nonetheless, the letter written by the Grand 
Vizier Bekri Mustafa Pasha and brought by Mustafa Aga from the capital to Vienna 
in October, 1689, names Zülfikar as ‘Efendi.’6 Regardless of the cultural differences 
between the connotations of the words, ‘Efendi’ may be accepted as equal to the 
rank of ‘Master’ in English, while ‘Pasha’ is equal to the ‘Lord.’ A Beylerbeyi 
already had to possess the rank of ‘Pasha’ in order to be able occupy this post. If 
Zülfikar was given the rank of Beylerbeyi of Rumelia, this indirectly means Zülfikar 
possessed the rank of ‘Pasha.’ Despite the conflict between the primary and 
secondary sources, one may conclude that Zülfikar was probably given the rank of 
Pasha so that he would be welcomed with high respect during his representation at 
the Habsburg court. Moreover, assuming that the Ottoman Sultan would let himself 
represented at the Habsburg court by someone called ‘Efendi,’ which was widely 
used for educated gentleman in Ottoman society, doesn’t conform to the facts of the 
Ottoman Imperial ideology, which will be explained below. However, during the 
narration, Zülfikar will be referred to as “Zülfikar Efendi” since the title of Pasha 
was only an interim one, valid only during his representation.   
Zülfikar Efendi was never announced as a peace seeker in the name of the 
Sultan. From the Ottoman point of view, it would absolutely detract from the high 
image of the Ottomans. Instead, he was disguised as a courier charged with the duty 
                                                 
4
 M. Alaadin Yalçınkaya, “Zülfikar Paşa,” Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi 
(Đstanbul: YKY, 1999), 703-704; Mehmed Süreyya, Sicill-i Osmanî Vol. 5 (Đstanbul: Tarih Vakfı 
Yurt Yayınlar, 1996); Franz Babinger, Osmanlı Tarih Yazarları ve Eserleri, trans. Coşkun Üçok 
(Ankara: 1982), 256-257. 
5
 “...Zülfikar Efendi ol işe me’mûren, Rumeli pâyesiyle hıl´at ilbâs olunup...” Defterdar Sarı 
Mehmed Paşa, Zübde..., 292. 
6
 Mustafa Güler. Zülfikâr Paşa’nın Viyana Sefâreti ve Esâreti: Cerîde-i Takrirât-i Zülfikâr Efendi 
[1099-1103 / 1688-1692] (Istanbul: Çamlıca, 2007), 135.  
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of reporting Sultan Süleyman III’s ascension. On July 10, 1688, Zülfikar Efendi 
departed from Istanbul with Alexander Mavrocordato, the palace dragoman since 
1673.  
Leopold I was feeling the pressure of all Christian Europe over him. Father 
Marco d’Aviano, counselor and spiritual guide to the Emperor, continued “pleading 
with Leopold to continue the Turkish war, to destroy the ancient enemy of the 
Church, and to remember always that his duty transcended the secular struggles of 
the western states,”7 Conditions stipulated by pressured Leopold were not the least 
bit tolerable to Zülfikar. The Emperor demanded abandonment of all Hungary and 
the territories associated with it. In a sense this meant that the Habsburgs laid claim 
to the entire Balkans.8 The demands of Poland and Venice similarly included heavy 
war compensations, territorial withdrawals, as well as several religious and 
commercial concessions. Zülfikar asserted the impracticality of the conditions. In 
short, negotiations had come to a standstill. The rest of Zülfikar’s time in Vienna, 
approximately three years, was to be spent striving to obtain a permission to return 
home. He and his entourage were locked in a castle where German soldiers 
patrolled day and night. The Austrian statesmen, especially commissary general 
Antonio Carafa, continued paying visits to Zülfikar and his delegation but 
apparently the circumstances never prospered. 
The current thesis is an attempt to examine Zülfikar’s visit in its European 
diplomatic context. It is intended to reflect the peace talks in Vienna from Zülfikar’s 
point of view, that is, of the Ottomans’.  
                                                 
7
 John Stoye, Marsigli’s Europe 1680-1730 The Life and Times of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, 
Soldier and Virtuoso (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1994), 71 
8
 For Habsburgs, “the Balkan lands were considered a legitimate part of the Hungarian crown.” Ivan 
Parvev, Habsburgs and Ottomans, 88. 
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Following the introduction in order to provide a background to the subject in its 
diplomatic context, Chapter II summarizes the studies on Ottoman diplomatic mind 
and how this diplomatic mind interacted with the Europeans during the early 
modern era. An evaluation of the limited existing studies on Ottoman diplomacy 
and how it functioned reveals that the main ground of the Ottoman international 
relations, which operated unilaterally and non-reciprocally until the end of the 
eighteenth century, was the imperial mind of the Ottomans. As one may notice in 
Chapter III and Chapter IV, Zülfikar’s intransigent objection to terms of the Holy 
League members originated from nothing but this Imperial mind, which first and 
foremost observed the dignity of the Sultan and Empire. In Zülfikar’s case it was 
confirmed at the cost of maintaining an exhaustive war. 
The main primary source of the study is the account recorded by Zülfikar in 
Vienna under the title Cerîde-i Takrirât-i Zülfikâr Efendi. Two recent transcriptions 
of the study are published before the completion of the present thesis. The first is 
prepared by Mustafa Güler and published under the title Zülfikar Paşa’nın Viyana 
Sefâreti ve Esâreti: Ceride-i Takrirât-i Zülfikar Efendi [1099-1103 / 1688-1692]. A 
second transcription is prepared by Songül Çolak and published with the title 
Viyana’da Osmanlı Diplomasisi (Zülfikar Paşa’nın Mükaleme Takriri). In the 
current study it’s preferred to make use of the first publication not only because it 
was already published when the study started but also the transcription method 
applied by the editor allows the reader to follow the dates and paragraphs in the text 
easier. Moreover, this first publication includes images of the primary text, which 
allows the researcher to compare with the transcription when needed.  
Having understood that the talks would end inconclusively, Zülfikar Efendi 
apparently ceased making proper records because the time flowed too quick and 
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with long intervals after the summer of 1689, when Zülfikar and his entourage 
began to ask permission papers to depart from Vienna. Therefore, except for several 
unremarkable details, it remains unknown to the researcher how the Ottoman 
representatives spent their captive-like last two years in Vienna.  
The lost muhimme registers of 1681-1688 hinders one from following the early 
phases of the developments from the Ottoman Palace’s point of view. Moreover, 
neither Zübde-i Vekaiyât by Defterdar Sari Mehmet Pasha, nor Tarih-i Raşid9 
includes additional information about Zülfikar other than known to the researchers. 
At that point Silahdar Tarihi of Silahdar Mehmed Aga, who lived in the palace 
during the 1680s and 1690s, provided compensation. To reflect on the social 
condition of the Ottoman Empire at that time, Silahdar’s text is employed now and 
again. Cengiz Orhonlu’s Osmanlı Đmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin Đskanı, in which the 
author depicted social mobilization in the Empire during the 1691-1696 period 
mainly drawing on muhimme registers of the early 1690s, and Ahmet Refik’s  Türk 
Hizmetinde Kral Tököli Đmre, transcriptions from the same period’s muhimme 
registers, have also been helpful to clarify certain questions. 
The subject was previously studied by Colin Heywood10 from the English aspect 
as a PhD thesis. Despite all the efforts, Heywood’s thesis unfortunately never 
became available to the author of the current study. However, Colin Heywood was 
generous enough to send an unpublished forthcoming paper11, which was originally 
delivered at University of London in June, 2007.  
                                                 
9
 Tarih-i Raşit was already a copy of Zübde-i Vekayiât. Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Paşa, Zübde, XLVI.  
10
 C. J. Heywood, ‘English Diplomacy between Austria and the Ottoman Empire in the War of the 
Sacra Liga, 1684-1699, with special reference to the period 1689-1699’. Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, University of London, 1970. 
11
 Colin Heywood, “Work in Progress?: William III’s Ostpolitik after Forty Years,” forthcoming 
article in Dutch Crossing, 2008. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY AND ITS PLACE IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
 
The visit of Zülfikar Efendi to the Habsburg court in 1688 was a milestone in 
Ottoman diplomatic history. An empire which for centuries had practiced unilateral 
and non-reciprocal policy making and implementation in diplomatic affairs was 
now seeking peace at the court of the Habsburgs, while welcoming Anglo-Dutch 
mediation. To articulately contextualize this visit to its place in Ottoman diplomatic 
history as well as the Ottoman’s to their place in early modern Europe, one first 
needs to shortly have a look at the origins of European States System1 and the 
international law, that is, the set of rules that began to dominate international 
relations in Europe roughly from Peace of Westphalia (1648) on. It will facilitate 
understanding the following debate on what the diplomatic mind of the Ottomans 
meant and how and to what extent this mind interacted with European diplomacy 
within the framework of the general position of the Ottomans in the newly emerging 
European States System. 
                                                 
1
 For an analysis of the origins of European State System, see Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and 
European States, Ad. 990-1992 (Studies in Social Discontinuity, Charles Tilly, ed.) (Oxford, 
Cambridge, Mass.: B. Blackwell: 1992), 161-191. An important analysis of the international 
system’s background is in, F. S. Northedge, The International Political System (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1976), especially 23-32. Mainly drawing on pre-1914 period, the author summarizes the roots 
of the system. 
9 
 
It is true that events, formations or perceptions throughout the history are always 
products of a myriad of historical factors and parameters which function as 
preliminary elements. The main characteristic of these elements is that they never 
come into being all of a sudden but almost always as outcomes of long historical 
processes. There have definitely been a number of such noticeable commonly 
accepted rules, that is, elements, followed by the European monarchs in peace 
negotiations prior to Peace of Westphalia. As emphasized by many experts of 
international relations, however, these commonly accepted rules did not produce a 
distinctly characterized international society in Europe until the Peace of 
Westphalia,2 save the fact that Peace of Westphalia itself again was only an 
immature stage in the long transformation period of the rules and procedures 
followed by the states in international relations throughout the centuries extending 
our time. 
What the Peace of Westphalia did mark…was the emergence of an 
international society as distinct from a mere international system, the 
acceptance by states of rules and institutions binding on them in their 
relations with one another, and of a common interest in maintaining them.3 
 
The foundations of the international law followed by this new international 
society in and after the seventeenth century were first laid by Hugo Grotius (1583-
1645), a Dutch jurist. His main work published in 1625, entitled De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis “obtained wide circulation and general recognition in the seventeenth 
century” and caused him to be called “Father of International Law.”4 
                                                 
2
 For a collection of the opinions about the place of Peace of Westphalia, see Andreas Osiander, 
“Sovereignity, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,” International Organization 55, 2, 
Spring (2001): 251-287. This article as a whole is a revision and a critique of the widely-accepted 
interpretations regarding Peace of Westphalia. 
3
 Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations,” in Hedley Bull, 
Benedict Anderson and Adam Roberts (eds.), Hugo Grotius and International Relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), 65-93. 
4
 Amos S. Hershey, “History of International Law Since the Peace of Westphalia,” The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 1912): 30-69. 
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If not the most original treatise written on the law of nations up to that time it 
was certainly the most systematic, dealing with the whole range of relations 
among independent political communities, with peace as well as with war, 
… assembling in a single work all the rules which were thought to exist 
bearing on these matters, and arranging them according to coherent 
principles.5 
 
The main features of Grotius’ view of international society were natural law, 
the universality of international society, individuals and non-state groups, and 
solidarism in the enforcement of rules.6 Having put forth for the first time by 
Grotius in a systematic way, these concepts have been pillars of the international 
law in Europe before too long, Peace of Westphalia being the first peace 
negotiation where these concepts were implemented by European nations. 
Meanwhile the Ottoman Empire was following a different set of rules in 
diplomatic affairs, originated from the Islamic law of nations, which caused 
them to ignore the aforementioned diplomatic rules and procedures followed by 
the European nations. This Islamic law of nations 
…as not based on mutual consent or reciprocity, but on their [Islamic states’] 
own interpretation of their political, moral and religious interest, as they 
regarded their principles of morality and religion superior to others.7 
 
 
2.1 Studies on Ottoman Diplomacy 
Most scholarship on the diplomatic history of the Ottoman Empire agree that 
prior to 1793, during the centuries of diplomatic interaction between the Europeans 
and Ottomans, the Ottoman Palace practiced an idiosyncratic interpretation of 
diplomacy. This approach thus assumes that the dispatch of the first permanent 
Ottoman ambassador, the assignment of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London in 1793, 
                                                 
5
 Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius,” 74. 
6
 For an elaborate discussion of these features, see Hedley Bull, “The Importance of Grotius,” 78-91. 
7
 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1979), 45. 
11 
 
marked the beginning of a new era in Ottoman diplomatic history.8 Ottoman 
historians, regardless of what aspect of the Ottoman diplomacy they study and if 
they are critical or not about the Ottomans’ understanding of diplomacy, are in 
consensus that the post-1793 period signified the beginning of a transformation 
from the preceding ad hoc diplomacy to the standards of modern European 
diplomacy, or in other words, from unilateralism to reciprocity.9  
A broad periodization10 groups Turkish diplomatic history into two eras: Pre-
Lausanne and post-Lausanne. The pre-Lausanne period is again divided into two in 
itself, 1793 being the landmark of shift from traditional standards of diplomacy to 
the European ones. The historiography on pre-1793 Ottoman diplomacy has so far 
focused on two principal factors that constructed the diplomatic mindset of the 
Ottomans. The first is the Ottomans’ perspective of the world in Islamic terms in all 
matters. According to Islamic law, the world was divided into two realms: the Dâr 
al Islam (the abode of Islam) and Dâr al-Harb (the abode of the Infidels). This 
binary division theoretically assumes an incompatibility and disaccord between the 
two halves. This image of the world, irrespective of whether the Ottomans were 
ever enthusiastic about it, hindered the Ottoman’s full integration into the non-
Muslim world both psychologically and institutionally. This abstention from 
engaging in reciprocal relations of course had implications for diplomatic affairs. In 
                                                 
8An important study on the first Ottoman residential missions in Europe is Ercüment Kuran, 
Avrupa’da Osmanlı Đkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu: Đlk Elçilerin Siyasi Faaliyetleri (Ankara: Türk 
Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1968).   
9
 Several most important works on the subject are: J.C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy and The 
European state System,” MEJ, 14 (1961): 147; Thomas Naff, “Ottoman Diplomatic Relations With 
Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Patterns and Trends,” in Thomas Naff and Roger Owen (eds.), 
Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History, (Carbondale: 1977), 88; Faik Reşit Unat, Osmanlı 
Sefirleri ve Sefaretnameleri (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1987), 14; A. Nuri Yurdusev, 
“The Ottoman Attitude Toward Diplomacy,” in A. Nuri Yurdusev (ed.), Ottoman Diplomacy 
Conventional or Unconventional (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 5; Bülent Arı, “Early 
Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period,” ibid., 37; A recent bibliographic study on Ottoman diplomatic 
history is Mehmed Alaaddin Yalçınkaya, “Kuruluştan Tanzimat’a Osmanlı Diplomasi Tarihi 
Literatürü,” TALĐD, 1 (2003): 423-489. 
10
 Halil Inalcık, “Türk Diplomasi Tarihinin Sorunlari,” in Çagdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 Yıllık Süreç 
(Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), xv-xviii. 
12 
 
regard to diplomacy, this mental distance from the non-Muslim world in due course 
fostered the growth of a feeling of superiority over the Europeans and caused the 
Ottomans to ignore the assignment of residential missions to the lands of their so-
called inferiors until the end of the eighteenth century. This attitude was conducive 
to the development of the second factor, that is, a set of diplomatic standards 
followed by the Ottomans until the late eighteenth century, which are accepted as 
the features of a long ad hoc period in Ottoman diplomacy. 
An early periodization attempt on Ottoman diplomatic history was made by J. C. 
Hurewitz.11 He argued that a rough periodization of post-1453 Ottoman diplomacy 
could include at least four phases. In this scheme, the first period extended till 1699 
and was characterized by a unilateralism that allowed the presence of residential 
foreign missions in the Ottoman capital – and even in some other important cities - 
while ignoring the dispatch of permanent Ottoman ambassadors to foreign 
countries. The second period, beginning with the Treaty of Carlowitz existed until 
the rise of Selim III (1789-1807) to the Ottoman throne, or more precisely, until the 
sending of Yusuf Agah Efendi to London in 1793, and “compelled the Sultans to 
negotiate” and paved the way for the “unilateralism of a contracting empire.” With 
Selim III, Ottomans now were a participant, if not a constituent, of reciprocal 
diplomacy and thus entered the third period of their diplomatic relations. Following 
the 1820s, during the fourth and the final period, Ottoman bureaucrats were striving 
to internalize the European standards of diplomacy so as to fully integrate their state 
machinery into the European state system.  
This periodization has never been challenged by alternative explanations and 
may in essence be assumed as an outline of the Ottoman diplomatic history. Indeed, 
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 J.C. Hurewitz, “Ottoman Diplomacy,” 145. 
13 
 
explaining the transformation of an historical fact with periodizations based on 
turning points of history is noticeably arbitrary and impedes conceptualization of 
the big picture that particularly holds importance in the construction of that fact.12 
Yet, the Peace Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 or Yusuf Agah Efendi’s mission to 
London in 1793, as evidences of Ottoman diplomacy’s adjustment to changing 
times, definitely marked critical points in Ottoman diplomatic history. Therefore, 
they might well represent ends and beginnings of new periods in Ottoman 
diplomacy. To better conceptualize the Ottoman diplomatic mind, however, the 
Ottoman historiography needs further theoretical and empirical contributions. 
Unfortunately, despite being an extension of political history, and thus having an 
advantage to outline the course of events that formed the Ottoman diplomatic 
mindset, the field of Ottoman diplomatic history still lacks studies delineating - in a 
collective fashion - the metamorphosis of Ottoman diplomatic mentality. One may 
argue that, until recently, the fate of the studies on the political history of the 
Ottomans has had indirect negative influence on the improvement of diplomatic 
studies. As emphasized by Gökhan Çetinsaya,13 studies on political history of the 
Ottoman Empire have been under the sway of ideological contentions which, as a 
fact, has hindered the flourishing of politically querying studies. Indeed, the scarcity 
of research on Ottoman political mentality is evidence to that. It is likely that the 
lack of detailed surveys exhaustively incorporating archival findings with existing 
secondary literature on political mind will continue to restrain authenticated 
research on the diplomatic mind. 
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 One may argue, however, that they facilitate understanding historical facts independently. 
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Gibi,”  TALĐD, 1 (2003): 7-15.  
14 
 
The most recent major contribution to the field has been Ottoman Diplomacy: 
Conventional or Unconventional?14 The book is composed of articles which delve 
into the matters of Ottoman diplomacy and clarify certain points pertaining to the 
subject. A. Nuri Yurdusev15 attempts to shed new light on the theoretical debates 
about the constituents of the Ottoman diplomatic mindset. In his article, Yurdusev 
firstly encapsulates the features of European diplomacy, which transformed into an 
institutionalized set of rules in the fifteenth century Italy with the first prototypes of 
resident embassies. He then explains how Islamic law was the principal component 
of Ottoman polity, and stresses that the Ottoman mind was pragmatic and they 
“pragmatically interpreted the precepts of Islam especially with regard to external 
affairs.”16 Subsequently, to clarify his claim that the Ottoman Empire - as an 
imperial system – was different from the other early modern European Empires, 
Yurdusev remarks: 
The modern European colonial empires were not really imperial systems. 
They were just colonial empires, having territorially consolidated states in 
their metropolitan area in Europe and colonies overseas. As an imperial 
system, the Ottoman Empire had all the notions and, perhaps, pretentions of 
universalism and self-sufficiency. When one examines the Ottoman attitude 
towards the emerging European states and diplomacy, the imperial character 
of the Ottomans must not be forgotten. The source of the Ottoman sense of 
superiority was partly Islam but more its imperial nature.17 
 
Yurdusev concludes that the aforementioned two factors, namely, Islam and 
more importantly the imperial nature of the Ottoman Empire, were the main 
elements of the Ottoman point of view towards Europe. He continues by stating 
that, contrary to many assumptions, even though the Ottomans’ feeling of 
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 A. Nuri Yurdusev (ed.), Ottoman Diplomacy Conventional or Unconventional (Palgrave 
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 A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude…,” 5-35; 
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superiority fostered the emergence and prolongation of an intrinsically unilateral 
understanding of diplomacy- first and foremost visible in their unwillingness to 
send residential missions to Europe –Ottomans were never disjointed from the 
European State System of the time. In other words, as the empirical data confirms, 
the Ottoman political and diplomatic machinery was an active and intervening 
component of the European State System.18 
Bülent Arı’s article analyses the existing knowledge on Ottoman diplomacy 
with archival evidence. The article provides a descriptive survey of the concepts and 
facts pertaining to the traditional and ceremonial procedures19 followed by the 
Ottoman central mechanism during the ad hoc period, namely, the period that ended 
in 1793.  Arı’s evaluation that “the Ottomans created their own method of 
diplomacy while respecting the pillars of Islam”20 concurs with Yurdusev’s 
assumption on the idiosyncrasy of the Ottoman Islamic interpretation. Likewise, the 
following comment of Bülent Arı supports Yurdusev’s stress on the imperial nature 
of the Ottoman Empire: 
As an acknowledgement of her superiority, the Ottoman government 
conducted a unilateral system of diplomacy with the European states. 
Sending an ambassador to a foreign country, particular to the enemy, was 
considered as a sign of inferiority.21 
 
An important reference to Arı should be made on his query about why the 
Ottomans eventually agreed to become a part of the European diplomatic network. 
He expresses that from the mid-eighteenth century on successive Russian victories 
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 A. Nuri Yurdusev, “The Ottoman Attitude,” 21-25. The Ottoman impact on the formation of 
European State System has been an independent issue in Ottoman historiography. In his article 
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 An earlier short descriptive study on the diplomatic procedures followed by the Ottomans is in 
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 Bülent Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy,” 37. 
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 Bülent Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy,” 44. 
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over the Ottomans left the floundering Ottoman central mechanism no alternative 
except to seek support in Europe against this northern enemy.22 
A third article by G. R. Berridge provides a solid argument to consolidate the 
past debates about the nonreciprocal and unilateral nature of Ottoman diplomacy 
which was allegedly independent from the European State System. The article, as 
claimed by its author, is a counterargument against the conviction that “the 
diplomatic links that connected the Ottoman Empire to Europe in the early modern 
Europe were weak and unsatisfactory.”23 Berridge claims that the Ottoman Empire 
that refrained from dispatching residential ambassadors “until the end of the 
eighteenth century was by no means entirely unrepresented beyond the Empire’s 
fluctuating borders.”24 Residents of Europe, merchants, couriers and administrators 
in European provinces of the Empire as well as special envoys, all were sources that 
helped Ottomans to remain in communication with Europe.25 Having summarized 
the advantages enjoyed both by the Ottomans and the Europeans, Berridge 
concludes that “as a result, it seems clear that there was a degree of diplomatic 
intercourse between the Ottoman Empire and the major powers of Europe,”26 a 
remark that should be scrutinized in order to strengthen our understanding of the 
late seventeenth century Ottoman world. 
 
2.2 Ottoman-European Interaction 
The opinion that politics were confined to relatively smaller territories prior to 
the sixteenth century and the outcomes of political decisions mainly affected only 
                                                 
22
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23
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the immediate area is a tenuous one. The transformation of inter-ruler conflicts into 
inter-continental ones, especially during and after the sixteenth century, brought 
about a more complex network of relations between the rulers, without diminishing 
the utility of alliances with bordering, but less powerful princes. The emergence of 
Ottoman-Habsburg relations in East Central Europe in the early sixteenth century 
coincided with, and perhaps marked, the onset of an era full of inter-monarchial 
disagreements and contentions, which were to dominate European politics. It is well 
established that from 1570 to 1683 Ottomans achieved the apex of their geographic 
expansion, which concurrently brought them to the limits of ‘action radius.’27 
However, when the trajectory of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into the 
early eighteenth century is observed, it is quite noticeable that the notorious 
Ottoman war machine continued to pose the most dangerous threat to some of its 
European counterparts, while also being a reliable ally to others. That is to say, it 
was still the most significant element of the “European state system.”  
Contrary to the long assumed institutionally disjointed and traditionally 
unconcerned image of Ottoman relations with the European powers prior to the end 
of the eighteenth century, the above discussion displaying the diplomatic dynamism 
of the Empire strengthens both old and new ideas about the prevailing interaction 
between the Ottoman and European worlds. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire, during its 
presence as a political entity, was an essential determinant on many aspects of 
European history. 
Putting relatively significant earlier periods aside, the interaction between the 
Ottomans and Europeans, in all the senses of the word, started at the end of the 
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fifteenth century, when the Italian wars erupted in the Continent,28 and then passed 
through its most important phase during the simultaneous rules of Süleyman the 
Lawgiver (1520-1566) and Charles V (1519-1556). Indeed, their ascension to two 
most significant thrones of the time in Europe opened another chapter in the rivalry 
of the two worlds, i.e., Ottoman and European.29 Süleyman’s direct intervention in 
European affairs can be traced back to the campaign of 1526, launched upon the 
request of Francis I of France,30 who was captured by Charles V at the Battle of 
Pavia (February 25, 1525). Süleyman’s foreign policy benefited from the religious 
contentions in the Continent especially in Central Europe and the formation of an 
environment which allowed the establishment of Protestant, Calvinist and Lutheran 
states.31 “It is convincingly argued that Ottoman pressure on the Habsburgs was an 
                                                 
28
 “Ottomans became an active part in the second stage of the Italian wars and there was a moment 
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important factor in the extension of Protestantism in Europe.”32 At the end of 
Süleyman’s reign,33 which witnessed the demise of two brothers from the House of 
Habsburg, that is, Charles V and Ferdinand, the significance of Ottomans relations 
with the Austrian Habsburgs subordinated any other rivalry within the Ottoman 
possessions.34 
Daniel Goffman, too, states that as early as the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
the Ottomans were a diplomatic element, may be the center, of the European 
system: 
Dutch, English, French and Venetian ambassadors resided in Istanbul, and 
the Ottomans became part – perhaps even the core – of the diplomatic 
system that had arisen out of Italy in the fifteen and sixteenth centuries.35 
 
Goffman makes an interesting remark about the Ottomans’ social integration 
with Europe in the seventeenth century, prior to the manifest institutional 
integration at the end of the eighteenth century. He claims that the integration 
process in fact accelerated in the seventeenth century but since Ottomans waited the 
end of the eighteenth century to join the European system institutionally, this 
process was not visible: 
In the Ottoman instance, the advance toward integration in fact quickened 
during the seventeenth century. This circumstance has not often been noted, 
perhaps because it was not reflected in the policies of the Ottoman state, 
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which sought to “reform” itself to past days of glory and did not begin 
emulating innovations in the rest of Europe until the following century. 
Rather than the government assuming the lead, Ottoman subjects and 
foreigners residing in Mediterranean port cities and along Balkan 
borderlands intensified their dialogues and carved out commercial and social 
enclaves along the Ottoman frontiers.36 
 
The author very recently articulated his opinions in a new article37 regarding the 
Ottoman diplomacy and its significant place within early modern Europe. Goffman 
claims that the peculiarities in the governing policy of the Ottomans allowed foreign 
ambassadors and subjects to settle in the Empire. Moreover the Sultans gave the 
former legal jurisdiction rights over the latter, that is, over their subjects: 
In the century or so after the Protestant Reformation, virtually all of Western 
Europe adopted the hopeful fantasy of cuius regio eius religio – the idea that 
the ruler’s religion must also be the religion of her or his subjects. In this 
climate, the display of heretical worship that most envoys demanded and 
most states proscribed paralyzed diplomatic relations between Catholic and 
Protestant states. Only in the seventeenth century did the concept of extra-
territoriality help resolve this dilemma. For the Ottomans, though, there 
never was such an issue. Beginning in the fifteenth century, not only did 
consul have legal jurisdiction over his “nation,” but each legate also had a 
church or chapel where he, his staff, and his community could worship 
freely…No other European state favored foreigners with such sweeping 
autonomy until long after the religious wars of the sixteenth century had 
helped shatter the idea of universal law. Thereafter, of course, the invention 
became and has remained an axiom of international diplomacy. Surely in 
Ottoman accommodation of foreign settlers we find an antecedent, and 
perhaps even a precedent, for such extra-territoriality.38 
 
Another illuminating article by Gabor Agoston39 provides evidence for the 
aforementioned remarks of the Ottoman historians about how the Ottoman 
administrative system efficiently gathered information on Europeans. Ambassadors 
in Istanbul and their interpreters, beylerbeyis and sancakbeyis in the provinces, 
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rulers of vassal principalities as well as agents, envoys and spies in Europe,40 all 
functioned as intelligence sources for the Ottomans and helped the Sultans stay up-
to-date about the circumstances in Europe.  
 
2.3 Conceptualizing Zülfikar’s Journey in the Context of Ottoman-
Habsburg Rivalry 
Where do we locate the visit of Zülfikar’s journey in this picture? For a better 
answer, one needs to sum up the outcomes. The Ottoman imperial system was long 
accepted as a disjointed and inactive component of the contemporary European 
world of its time. The fallacy behind the thought was an assumption based on the 
Islamic division of the world between Muslim and non-Muslim lands, according to 
which a conflict between Dâr al Islam (the abode of Islam) and Dâr al-Harb (the 
abode of the Infidels) was supposedly destined to take place. The Quranic teaching 
commands that the faithful lean towards peace if the enemy does the same.41  This 
aside, the Ottomans, as emphasized by specialists of Ottoman history,42 had their 
idiosyncratic interpretation of Islamic law, which primarily observed pragmatism 
for the state. For long years, the Sultans welcomed the presence of non-Muslims in 
their lands because, in addition to what Islam instructed, the state simply benefited 
from their presence. For nearly three centuries before 1793, foreign residential 
missions to the Ottoman lands prevailed.  However, the Sultans never considered 
appointing permanent representatives in foreign countries to collect information on 
European diplomatic affairs since non-Muslim subjects were efficiently functioning 
as elements of the Ottoman diplomatic system. That is to say, the Ottoman system 
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developed its own diplomatic means and manners.  Such a system would operate 
effectively only as long as the Ottomans were strong enough to ignore the strength 
of their rivals. Zülfikar was a representative of the summarized diplomatic mind. 
 
2.3.1 The Condition of the Ottomans fronts in Europe on the Eve of 
Zülfikar’s Journey 
What compelled the Ottomans to seek peace at the Habsburg court in 1688 were 
the dire straits they faced in the midst of a war fought on three different fronts. 
During the 1660s and 1670s Hungary was restless with a desire for independence. 
Nicholas Zrinyi and Count Imre Thököly, the two most important leaders of the 
nationalist movement, initiated an anti-Habsburg and anti-Catholic movement. In 
the 1660s and 1670s they appealed to the former Grand Vizier Fazil Ahmed Pasha 
(1661-1676), requesting his assistance. Fazil Ahmet Pasha, who tasted defeat 
against the Habsburgs at St. Gotthard in 1663 and probably saw the limits of 
military intervention to Central Europe from Istanbul, ignored the fomentations in 
Hungary and remained indifferent to these developments. Kara Mustafa Pasha, who 
took over the post of Grand Vizier in 1676 after Fazil Ahmed Pasha’s death, was a 
harsh person, dreaming glorious triumphs. He fully benefited from Sultan Mehmed 
IV’s detachment from state affairs and determined the fate of the Ottomans to a 
great extent for the rest of their existence in this stage of history. He fixed his eyes 
on Vienna and, on the pretext of aforesaid agitations in Hungary, did not hesitate to 
launch a very large scale campaign into Hungary that ended with the siege laid on 
the Habsburg capital, again by the Turks.43 
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 In 1683, the determining factor on the campaign decision more than anything was the enthusiasm 
and resoluteness of the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa (1676-1683) to realize a glorious victory. In 
Ottoman and Central European historiography, the motivations of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha 
in the 1683 campaign are still a complex question and yet to be answered panoptically. Historians 
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The siege of Vienna concluded with the complete failure of the Ottomans. It 
became a rallying cry for nations waiting to take their revenge from the Ottomans, 
and paved the way for the formation of a Holy League against the Ottomans, owing 
much to the support of the Pope. Poles, who lost a number of strongholds in Podolia 
to the Sultan in the 1670s and whose peace seeking envoy was humiliated at the 
Ottoman capital afterwards by Kara Mustafa Pasha, and Venice, which fought to 
                                                                                                                                        
offered a number of answers taking into account both internal and external various factors from the 
viewpoint of the Ottoman Empire, not excluding the personal ambitions of the Grand Vizier. 
Traditionally, Kara Mustafa Pasha is considered to be the culprit of the outcomes of 1683, since he 
was the mastermind behind this vast mobilization of Ottoman military resources. Two early Ottoman 
historians, Joseph Freiherr von Hammer-Purgstall and Nicolae Iorga, offered two different views. 
The former had no doubt that Kara Mustafa Pasha was planning to establish a Muslim Empire in the 
West, Vienna being the capital city and he himself the Sultan; while the latter argued that the 
operation was simply a reflection of the Ottoman tradition regenerated by first two Köprülü viziers, 
according to which the subjects should have been fed with warfare each year and the Sultan would 
celebrate the fruits of the campaigns during falls and springs. Kara Mustafa Pasha, usually portrayed 
as one of the most arduous and demanding Grand Viziers of the Empire, completely suited both of 
these explanations.  According to Silahdar, as the march towards Belgrade started, Kara Mustafa’s 
clerk Mustafa fueled his already passionate master by encouraging him to turn towards the Austrian 
capital, thus playing a role in the Grand Vizier’s decision. Silahdar noted that the clerk, allegedly a 
French convert, stated that with such a vast force it would be pointless to march onto Györ, the 
original target of the expedition and a citadel already surrounded by Ottoman possessions. Iorga, 
Osmanlı, Vol. 4, 165. Mustafa said to his master that if he captured Vienna, his power would be 
equal to that of Persian King Khosrow I (also known as Anushiravan the Just, 531-579), a richness 
and authority possessed only by a handful of rulers throughout the history. He continued that, once 
Vienna was taken, the German princes would come under his rule; he would expand his sovereignty 
to the Western spheres of Germany and would provide another income source to Istanbul’s treasury 
equal to that of Egypt. Silahdar Fındıklılı Mehmed Ağa, Silahdar Tarihi Vol. 2 (Đstanbul: Devlet 
Matbaası, 1928), 18-19.  It would be quite right to emphasize that a Grand Vizier, especially one as 
bold as Kara Mustafa Pasha, who was already seeking an opportunity to gain reputation and respect, 
would not determine the destination of a campaign in regard to a clerk’s words. But what he put into 
practice in the end conforms to the words of his clerk, which helps one to understand Kara Mustafa 
Pasha’s psychology before the siege. Other historians argue that the financial crisis led the Grand 
Vizier into this campaign. For those, the proof lies in Kara Mustafa’s unwillingness to capture the 
city with direct march, lest the soldiers sack its treasuries after bringing down its already weakened 
ramparts. Interestingly, there were even views reducing the reason to a simpler issue by arguing that 
the Grand Vizier was in love with a princess. Both views in: Ernst Petrisch, “Avusturya’nın Bakış 
Açısından Kara Mustafa Paşa” in Merzifonlu Kara Mustafa Paşa Uluslararası Sempozyumu 08-11 
Haziran 2000, (Ankara: Merzifon Vakfı Yayınları, 2000), 91-99. Whatever the reason, the campaign 
symbolized the Ottoman devotedness to strengthen their domination in East-Central Europe and had 
a strategic significance on a line that spread from Dalmatia to Podolia over Transylvania, and, 
actually, it served as a perfect example of how one statesman can change an empire’s destiny. But it 
should also be evaluated within the context of larger trends in military and political history. In a very 
long process that might be expanded well into the mid-twentieth century, gaining new territories and 
geographically expanding a state’s area of influence and authority has been a major goal of 
statesmen. Kara Mustafa Pasha, in the end, was a character of the early modern world, where war 
and valor on the battlefield for any nation was both a usual and a respectable way of expressing their 
strategies and policies. At a time when the entire Europe was under pressure of the ambitions of 
monarchs and rulers of all sizes, one cannot blame Kara Mustafa Pasha because of his courage and 
eagerness to have an attempt at testing the limits of the Ottoman territorial expansion. Nonetheless, 
the consequence of the war proved once more that courage and eagerness are not the only 
prerequisites of victory. 
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defend Crete against the Ottomans but failed in 1669 after probably the longest 
siege of history, both joined Leopold in March 168444 in an agreement long 
dreamed of by Pope Innocent XII.45 
The first resistance point against the Habsburg armies was northern Hungary. 
The Habsburg’s primary objective in the early years of the war was capturing this 
region, centered at the Ottoman stronghold Budin (Buda). By the end of 1685, 
Habsburgs took Uyvar and, in 1686, Budin, after several futile attempts to capture 
the latter during the previous three years. From 1686 on, coordinating and 
actualizing the campaigns was a very difficult task for the Ottoman Empire. In 
addition to the scarcity caused by incessant warfare, famines ruined the physical 
well-being of the people, who resorted to a diet of wild plants and rinds.46  
The next two years, 1687 and 1688, brought the Ottoman presence in Hungary 
to an end. The Habsburg allied army defeated the Ottoman troops along all of the 
battlefronts in Hungary and made their way towards the south from three points: 
Northern Hungary, Buda, and Croatia.  
In 1687, a series of events eventually brought Mehmet IV’s thirty-nine years of 
rule to an end.47 On the eve of 1687 the imperial treasury was completely empty.48 
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 Attempts of the Pope were not limited to these. Right after the siege, in November 1683, the Pope 
had also mentioned to a French ambassador in Rome his plans to divide the Ottoman Empire and 
tried to gain French support too. Ivan Parvev, Habsburgs and Ottomans, 42. France never joined the 
Holy League. Moreover, two envoys from Europe were sent to Persia to request their support by 
declaring war on the Ottomans in eastern Anatolia. This attempt also proved futile.  In fact, Polish 
and Austrian diplomats had already started arguing – and disagreeing – on the future of 
Transylvanian principalities before they launched the united offensive. Nicolae Iorga, Osmanlı 
Tarihi Vol. 4 (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005), 178-179. 
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 Charles Ingrao claims that the Pope mobilized a variety of sources all over the continent “to 
finance” this unity “what could justly be termed as the last great crusade,” Charles Ingrao, The 
Habsburg Monarchy..., 78. In fact, for the Ottomans –in regard to above explained pragmatism and 
the personal motivations of Kara Mustafa Pasha- one can argue that the Ottomans motivations were 
not primarily religious. Correspondingly, in light of the personal ambitions of Leopold to regain 
Hungarian territories, one can assume that pragmatic goals of the League had priority in terms of 
realpolitik as opposed to the Crusades of the previous centuries. Nicolae Iorga, Osmanlı, Vol 4, 177.  
46
 Silahdar, Silahdar, Vol 2, 243-44. 
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 Mehmed IV had ruled concurrently with two of the most remarkable sovereigns of European 
history: Louis XIV of France and Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I. In personality, Sultan Mehmet 
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There was no money to afford the new year’s campaigns. This induced Mehmet IV 
and the Grand Vizier to resort to several unconventional sources of finance. In 
addition to demanding imposition of war (imdâdiye) from the ´ulema and taking 
money from the orphan’s coffer, the incomes of some imperial and stipendiary fiefs 
were allocated to the imperial treasury.49 The ´ulema’s reaction to this arrangement 
gave stimulus to the deposition process of Mehmet IV.50 During the same year, the 
Grand Vizier’s incapability of administrating the army resulted in a heavy loss at 
Mohac, on August 12, 1687.51 
The withdrawal of the army from southern Hungary in 1687, an act which left 
the battlefront entirely vulnerable, ended with the deposition of Sultan Mehmet IV 
by the common efforts of the ‘ulema and rebellious soldiers. After his deposition, 
Mehmed IV was put under surveillance in the Palace and his brother Süleyman III 
ascended to the throne in November 1687. Meanwhile, Leopold had the opportunity 
to exert his reign on Hungary. The diet gathered in Pressburg on October 31, 1687, 
and concluded with the election of Leopold’s son Joseph (1678-1711) as the King 
of Hungary. Moreover, by that time, Leopold had already fulfilled a treaty with the 
                                                                                                                                        
IV was far from superseding some of his ancestors in competition with the European monarchs. Both 
Louis and Leopold, keen rivals of each other and individually powerful monarchs, contributed 
considerably to the strategic flourishing of their sovereignty in Europe. When the trajectory of the 
seventeenth century Ottoman Empire is observed, Mehmet IV had ruled long enough at relatively 
prosperous periods of the Empire, owing much to the fruitful regime of the Köprülü family members 
as Grand Viziers. In the 1660s and 1670s he had enjoyed the climax of the territorial expansion of 
the Ottoman authority in Central Europe. However, hunting parties had been his first occupation at a 
time when he could have worked to strengthen the Ottoman control in the region. He was such an 
obsessive hunting fan that he could not put off his hunting parties even when the Empire was going 
through the hardest days in its history. His reckless administration played a part in his dethronement. 
48
 Silahdar, Silahdar, Vol 2, 261. 
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 Silahdar, Silahdar, Vol 2, 262-263.  
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 Silahdar, Silahdar, Vol 2, 270. 
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 The war at Mohac, where previously in 1526 Süleyman II paved the way to Ottoman domination 
in Hungary, was the last reentrance attempt of the Ottoman Empire into Central Europe. In other 
words, their presence in Central Europe ended where it had started. During the months in 1687 
reports kept coming from Egri and many other citadels, informing the urgent need for backing, but 
only in vain. The routes were blocked by the Habsburg troops and the Ottoman soldiers were 
discouraged by perpetual mobilization without a gain. Furthermore, the presence of intractable ex-
brigand soldiers impaired the traditional troops’ devotion to their generals and engendered a 
rebellious manner in the whole body of the army, thus bringing the Ottomans to the threshold of total 
collapse in Europe. Silahdar, Vol 2, 271-75. 
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ruler of Transylvania. On October 27, 1687, with the treaty of Blasendorf, 
Transylvania was finally convinced that the Habsburg presence in the region was 
permanent and agreed to pay 700.000 thalers to the Habsburgs.52 
As a result of this treaty, during the four years following the siege of Vienna in 
1683, Ottoman presence in Central Europe came to an end after almost two 
centuries. Protection of Hungary, the most important element of the Ottoman 
administrative system in Europe,53 necessitated a sapient and constantly vigilant 
military and political structure for long decades because the political proclivities of 
the locals were continuously oscillating between the Ottoman and Habsburg 
capitals. In only four years after 1683, Habsburg armies not only advanced into 
Hungary but also captured Belgrade and progressed further into the Balkan core 
lands of the Ottoman Empire with little difficulty. The Empire consumed all its 
resources. The discouraged soldiers were not obeying the orders to confront the 
continuously progressing enemies and, to exacerbate the situation, there were no 
sapient statesmen to take control. Considering the aforementioned psychological 
feeling of superiority over the Europeans, a peace call by the Ottomans was the least 
likely thing to happen. However, on July 11, 1688, Zülfikar and Alexander 
Mavrocordato, the Palace dragoman, were ordered to set off for Vienna. 
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 Interestingly, during the four years following the defeat at Vienna, Apafy I Michael, the Prince of 
Transylvania from 1661 to 1690, continued sending his tribute to the Ottoman capital. Apafy, 
indeed, had cogent reasons to wish Ottoman protection over his principality. A peculiarity of the 
Ottoman sovereignty over Central European principalities was granting autonomous administration 
to the magnates, whereas Habsburg rule in its possessions was characterized by direct intervention, 
which, in Transylvania and Hungary, always created a religious squabble. However, in 1687, Apafy 
had nothing to do but give way to the continuously progressing Habsburg armies. 
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 Hungary, first of all, was fuctioning as a buffer region hindering direct Habsburg intervention to 
East Central European principalities. It was also economically important as the last stop of the spice 
route that started from Bursa in the sixteenth century and was still a slave trade point in the 
seventeenth century. For a survey of the place of Hungary in sixteenth century Ottoman Empire, see 
Halil Đnalcık, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 4th edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 299-311. One may argue, however, that the significance of 
Hungary on the part of Ottomans was based on being an Islamic frontier post in the heart of Central 
Europe, on lands where the Holy Roman Emperors claimed hereditary rights for centuries.   
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Ascension of a new Sultan to the Ottoman throne was apparently interpreted by 
the Ottoman statesman as a legitimate excuse to send a peace envoy to the Habsburg 
court. Theoretically, this could not occur without the Sultan’s approval, but since 
Süleyman III spent all his life imprisoned in the Palace, it may be a spurious 
argument to assume that he took the initiative as soon as he became the ruler. It was 
most probably not the Sultan himself but the Ottoman statesmen in the Palace who 
considered the replacement of the Sultan as an opportunity to attempt to negotiate a 
peace treaty. 54 Zülfikar Efendi set of for Vienna in July, 1688 without knowing that 
he would soon be a quasi-captive representative of the Sultan in Vienna, although 
Habsburg statesmen advised Leopold on October 30, 1688, before Zülfikâr and 
Mavrocordato’s presence at Vienna, “to agree to a negotiation” with them.55 
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 Colin Heywood mentions ‘a peace party within the civil bureacracy,’ who supported the mission 
but doesnt give any name. Colin Heywood, “English Diplomatic Relations with Turkey, 1689-1698,” 
in Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations, in William Hale and Ali Đhsan Bağış (eds.), (North 
Humberside: The Eothen Press, 1984), 26-39. It seems more reasonable to argue that, in regard to the 
circumstances at the fronts during the last years, which constantly developed to the disadvantage of 
the Ottomans, most probably the general tendecy in the Palace was already towards peace, regardless 
of whether there were conflicting parties on the issue. 
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 John Stoye, Marsigli’s Europe, 71. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 AN OTTOMAN ENVOY 
IN HOFBURG  
 
 
 
3.1 Ottomans and the Europeans Involved In the Peace Talks  
 
3.1.1 A Retrospective of the Diplomatic Relations in the Last Quarter of the 
Seventeenth Century 
In his explanatory book about the rise of the European powers from the end of 
the seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, Jeremy Black has 
suggested that “Europe did change considerably in the period, not in technological, 
economic, social or governmental terms, but at least in territorial and political 
matters.”1  
Over the course of the seventeenth century the political activities and militarily 
dynamic condition of the European powers began to play more of a role in the 
European affairs than ever before. The second siege of Vienna was realized in the 
early phases of this time. Warfare in Eastern Europe that followed the siege of 
Vienna was not only preceded but also accompanied by a series of other 
consequential wars in the western sphere of the continent. An important aspect of
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 Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers: 1679-1793 (London: Edward Arnold, 1990), xiii. 
 29
these interactions at the end of the seventeenth century was that the fighting did not 
take place only between the so-called Great Powers of the time, i.e., France, 
Austria, England and Ottoman Empire, but also included other secondary-rank 
rulers on the continent. 2 Every single political entity of the time, irrespective of its 
strength, sought an alliance group to benefit from in the short or long run. Since not 
only the Habsburgs, Venetians and Poles, but also the French, English and Dutch, 
participated in the talks in Vienna, the diplomatic network of the time necessitates a 
detailed delineation.   
      A snapshot of each nation gives the following picture: the Habsburgs, Venetians 
and Poles, members of the Holy League, were fighting against the Ottomans. The 
Habsburgs were also a part of an old rivalry with France, which continuously 
engendered war in Western Europe during the second half of the seventeenth 
century. Since the Habsburgs were the common enemy of the Muslim Ottoman 
Empire and Christian France, the Ottoman Empire and France had a love-hate 
relationship. The English and Dutch also joined France in the war against the 
Habsburgs because French King Louis XIV’s ambitions in Western Europe 
permanently jeopardized their interests and well-being in the region. And since the 
English and Dutch always needed Leopold to stand against the French, the 
Emperor’s occupation in Eastern Europe was undesirable for them. While Zülfikar 
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 According to Black, most of the remarkable and transformatory events of the seventeenth century 
came into being in the 1680s, not during Thirty Years’ War: “It is equally appropriate to suggest that 
in so far as a major division can be seen in seventeenth-century European political history it should 
be located in the 1680s; that the previous decades can be regarded as in many respect a different 
period, one that marked the continuation of the group of major conflicts that began in the late 1610s 
and continued in the Thirty Years’ War.” Black argues that there were three main turning points in 
Europe in the 1680s: 1- The defeat of the Turks, which led to Austria’s rise as a great power, 2- 
Russia’s emergence as a great power, 3- Britain’s ‘Glorious Revolution’ and the outbreak of an 
Anglo-French conflict as a consequent of it. He adds a number of secondarily important events to 
these three. Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers, 3-6. For an analysis of the political 
achievements in Europe at the end of the seventeenth century, see David Kaiser, Politics and War: 
European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler (Cambridge-Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1990), 196-202. 
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was in Vienna, Anglo-Dutch missions in the Ottoman and Habsburg capitals 
struggled to bring the war in Eastern Europe to an end. 
      It is useless to emphasize that the Ottoman peace attempt originated from the 
desperate condition of the Empire. By the time peace talks began in Vienna, the 
snapshot of the Ottoman fronts against the Holy League did not look promising. The 
united German army had advanced into the Balkans and was trying to make its way 
into Serbia and Bulgaria, where support of the local Christian population 
considerably helped the Imperials.  Encouraged by the presence of Habsburg armies 
in the lower basins of the Danube along the Serbian and Bulgarian territories, the 
Christian population revolted, adding to the pressure of prolonged warfare.  In 
summer of 1689, Istanbul was already informed of the Habsburg generals’ letters 
and patents calling on the local Christian populace to revolt against the Sultan.3 
Both voluntary military detachments (which were occasionally supported by the 
hajduts, and which later became part of the Habsburg army in the Balkans)4 as well 
as regular Habsburg army troops acted upon the patents that had been issued.5 To 
deal with the Christian population’s revolt along the Danube, the Palace charged the 
provincial governments and Imre Thököly.  An edict addressed to the beylerbeyis in 
Rumelia and to Imre Thököly in October 1689 ordered them to cooperate in order to 
deal with the problem along the Danube.6  Leopold, who always considered Louis a 
greater menace than the Sultan, constantly suffered from disadvantageous treaties 
with the Ottoman Empire and the anti-Habsburg revolts in Hungary. As was 
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 Silahdar, Silahdar, Vol 2, 490-91. 
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 Ivan Parvev, Habsburgs and Ottomans, 76. 
5Ivan Parvev, Habsburgs and Ottomans, 87. However, Charles Ingaro notes that “The Balkan 
peoples welcomed the imperial army at first, especially after Leopold had promised them religious 
freedom, tax exemptions, and national autonomy. Yet the proselytyzing of the Jesuit missionaries 
who accompanied it soon cooled their enthusiasm and eliminated any chance of a general uprizing 
against Ottoman rule.” Charles Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy, 81. 
6
 Ahmet Refik, Türk Hizmetinde Kral Tököli Đmre: Macar Kralı Tököli Đmre’ye Dair Hazine-i Evrak 
Vesikaları (Đstanbul: Mualim Ahmet Halim Kütüphanesi, 1922), 11-12. 
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stressed above, Leopold strived to thwart Kara Mustafa Pasha’s campaign, but his 
envoy was ignored by the Grand Vizier.  Now, the developments were beyond his 
expectations.  
Since the 1644 Ottoman declaration of war against Crete (which they captured 
eventually), Ottoman-Venetian relations were not optimal. After the siege of 
Candia, which ended in 1669, the Venetian envoys dispatched to Ottoman capital 
had one purpose: to hinder further attacks on Venetian possessions.7 When the 
Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha revealed his plan to march into Hungary, 
Venetians seemed to have gained what they wanted. But when the Ottoman armies 
failed in Vienna, the Venetians were ready to welcome the Pope’s call to join the 
Holy League. They attacked the Ottoman possessions from three fronts: Mora 
(Morea), Bosnia and the Aegean islands. Under the command of Francesco 
Morosini, who had defended Crete against the Ottomans two decades before, the 
Venetian army, reinforced by Genoese, Spanish, Florence and Maltese fleets, 
completed the capture of Mora in 1686, and the fall of Athens soon followed in 
1687.  Just as it had helped the Habsburgs, the local Christian population helped the 
Venetians, facilitating their penetration both in Mora and in Bosnia.8 Letters from 
Ragusa to Venice, dated late 1686, reported the news of fleeing Turkish populations 
in Bosnia.9  Ottoman attempts to stop the Venetians were futile.10 
Ottoman-Polish relations followed a relatively peaceful course until the 1660s; 
however, they began to retrograde gradually after the 1667 Polish-Russian 
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 For a survey of the relationship between the Ottomans and the Venetians from 1670 on, see 
Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: The 
American Philosophical Society, 1991), 244-388. 
8
 Đsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi, Vol. 3 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, ?), 
480. 
9
 Kenneth M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks, 279.  
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 A collection of primary documents from Bosnian court registers of 1691-1694 provides evidence 
of problems encountered by the Ottomans on the Venetian front in Hersek (Herzegovina). Halil 
Đnalcık, “Saraybosna Şeriye Sicillerine Göre Viyana Bozgunundan Sonraki Harb Yıllarında Bosna,” 
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agreement.11 This agreement disregarded Ukrainian Cossack existence in the region 
while dividing their land and led to the conquest of Kamaniçe (Kamianetz) by the 
Ottomans in 1672, as a result of the Cossacks’ call for help from the Sultan. The 
treaty of Bucaş (Buczacz) the same year required Poles to pay a tribute to the 
Ottomans. When the Polish envoy Jan Gninski visited Istanbul in 1677 following 
the Ottoman conquests in southern Poland, the Poles were aiming at acquiring at 
least a truce with the Ottomans because they were fighting on another front in the 
north. Already allied with France, the Poles wanted to secure their borders with the 
Ottomans. However, Gninski, in his meeting with the Grand Vizier, was the second 
envoy to be humiliated at the Ottoman Palace.  Regarding Gninski as the 
representative of an inferior state, Kara Mustafa firmly asserted that whether the 
Poles were angry at the Sublime Porte or full of respect, the Ottoman Empire 
needed neither their friendship nor enmity.12 Irrespective of his need for peace on 
the northern Polish border while planning a campaign against the Habsburgs, Kara 
Mustafa ruled out the possibility of Polish neutrality with his manner. This gave 
course to the Poles’ rise as an enemy to the Ottomans in the north. Later, by 
bringing the siege of Vienna to an end, the Poles would be the protector and savior 
of Europe against the Ottoman armies. After the treaty of Holy League, the only 
front where Ottomans could be considered successful was the Polish front, where 
their success consisted of repelling Polish attacks on Kamaniçe, owing much to the 
support of the Crimean Khan. 
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 The same year, in order to appease the reservations of the Ottomans, the Poles sent an envoy to the 
Ottoman capital, but Kara Mustafa Pasha, who was kaymakam at that time, humiliated the Polish 
envoy, only later granting the ‘ahdname. Dariusz Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic 
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3.1.2 Louis XIV’s Determinant Role 
The consequence of French foreign policy in the second half of the seventeenth 
century is debatable.13 In regard to the interest of the current study (namely, the 
Ottoman peace attempt in Vienna and its background), the repercussions of Louis’s 
foreign policy were profoundly consequential.14 Indeed, owing much to Louis’s 
aspirations for the throne of Leopold, the western sphere of Europe was never more 
peaceful than the east. In 1686, Leopold had to establish the Grand Alliance (the 
League of Augsburg), which was another very considerable formation at that time 
in regard to its repercussions over the course of the ongoing Ottoman-Habsburg 
war. A number of political entities joined Leopold in the Grand Alliance against the 
French, and in fact, it was only France which remained outside this union of 
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 The French foreign policy of the time, which interfered in every branch of the diplomatic network 
in the second half of the seventeenth century (especially after Louis XIV consolidated power in his 
hand personally), is today interpreted as free from premeditation. Contrary to what was previously 
believed to have been a feature of a so-called long-run ambition, now it is thought that the principal 
motivation of Louis XIV’s aggresive policies was pragmatism: that is, his motivations were 
changing quickly in accordance with French interests: “Interpretations that assume an obvious course 
of action fly in the face of the international situation of the age and the problems and the 
opportunities confronting Louis.” Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers, 31. A 
resemblance between the Ottoman Imperial mind and Louis’s personal perception of honour is 
noteworthy. Louis was “sensitive to the last degree in anything which affects his honour. In his eyes 
the defence of the honour or reputation (gloire) of France was inseperable from his own. It must be 
protected above all else, especially as he was convinced that France was the leading state in Europe 
and that he was the leading sovereign and his house the leading dynasty.” Derek McKay, H.M. Scott, 
The Rise of the Great Powers 1648-1815 (London-New York: Longman, 1994), 16. For a 
comparison, see Chapter II, footnote 9. For an explanation of the view that the warfare at the end of 
the seventeenth century mainly aimed at glory, see David Kaiser, Politics and War, 196-198. 
14
 The abiding ambition of Louis the XIV during his almost three quarters long rule was establishing 
French hegemony in Europe in expense of Habsburg hegemony. In order to realize his goal he didn’t 
hesitate to both support and fight against the Ottoman Empire. When the Habsburg general 
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Western European monarchs: Austria, Bavaria, Brandenburg, England, the 
Palatinate of the Rhine, Portugal, Saxony, Spain, Sweden and the United 
Provinces15 all joined Leopold to stop Louis XIV, who at the negotiations of 
Regensburg (Ratisbon) in August 1684 had benefited from Leopold’s occupation 
with the Ottoman war. At Regensburg, Louis had managed to keep his acquisitions, 
namely, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, in exchange for a truce with the Emperor. For 
a couple of years Louis did not continue his habitual aggressiveness against the 
Emperor: Regensburg had brought him to the high point of his territorial expansion. 
Thanks to Louis’s inactivity during that time, Leopold seized the opportunity of 
gaining Hungary and brought one and a half centuries of Ottoman expansion into 
Central Europe to an end. But it should be emphasized in advance that when 
Austrian armies progressed from all quarters towards Ottoman possessions in the 
Balkans, it changed Leopold’s image in Europe and eventually paved the way for 
the French King’s next declaration of war against Leopold in September 1689.16 
The Emperor responded the next month on October 18 in like manner, and the war 
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in Western Europe that followed first and foremost helped the Ottomans by 
providing room for recovery in 1690 and 1691. 
It was highlighted above how Louis’s manifesto quickly followed the fall of 
Belgrade, since its capture meant an incredible expansion in Leopold’s sphere of 
influence. Zülfikar’s notes tell us that, nonetheless, a lesser known factor that 
influenced Louis’s decision was a letter sent by the French ambassador at Istanbul. 
Upon the departure of the Ottoman delegation from the capital, the ambassador 
posted a message to his king and explained how a probable peace treaty would 
damage the relations between the French and Ottomans. According to Zülfikâr’s 
narration, the chief reservation of the ambassador was not the peace treaty itself but 
rather a possible alliance between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs against the 
French. The letter arrived in France by mid-September and was followed by Louis’s 
manifesto on war against Leopold in only ten days. Zülfikâr bemoans that Belgrade 
could not stand for another couple of weeks.17 He argues that if Belgrade, a heavily 
fortified key city, could stand for another couple of weeks, the Habsburgs would 
have severe problems in forming a defensive line beyond the Danube. Unfortunately 
for the Ottomans, Belgrade was captured only ten days before the Habsburgs started 
drawing back upon the call of Leopold to unite with the Dutch and English against 
the French. One may not know for sure whether holding Belgrade in 1689 would 
have contributed in successive years to directing the course of war in favor of the 
Ottomans, but in the following campaign seasons the conquest of Belgrade was 
going to be the primary objective of the Sultan. 
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3.2 Zülfikar’s Departure, Arrival at Vienna and First Contacts 
On July 12, 1688, Zülfikâr Efendi and the Palace dragoman Alexander 
Mavrocordato were appointed as Ottoman envoys to the Habsburg court. They 
arrived at Niš in twenty-five days. They departed from Niš but had to return with 
Yeğen Osman Pasha, who was fleeing from the Habsburg armies, leaving the 
Danubian frontier wide open against the Habsburg forces. Zülfikar sent a letter to 
the Habsburg commander Piccolomini18 and requested a protection paper, 
safeguards and a translator in order to continue his journey. Yeğen Osman Pasha 
and Zülfikar dispatched two separate letters also to Istanbul, the former informing 
the Sultan about the state of the frontier and the latter informing him about the 
condition of the journey.19 
Yeğen Osman Pasha was a former brigand. Since the Ottoman armies were 
engaged in battles at three fronts, the Palace could not find any means of handling 
him except recruiting him as the general of the Austrian front. He and his bandits 
joined the Sultan’s army in March 1687 to hold the line at Esek, where the Danube 
intersects the Drava. By sending Yeğen Osman Pasha and his troops to the 
battlefront, the Palace aimed to eliminate them, as the Palace had decided that the 
expenditures for Pasha and his troops, which came (quite untraditionally) from the 
orphan’s coffer, were being fruitlessly used.  But Yeğen Osman Pasha figured out 
the plot against him, and he escaped from engagement with the enemy. 
On August 22, Zülfikar sent another letter to Maximilian Emmanuel, Bavarian 
Elector of the Holy Roman Empire and the commander of the Imperial army that 
besieged Belgrade the same month, and requested him to send safeguards who 
would escort the Ottoman delegation along the Habsburg possessions until they 
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arrived at Vienna. On August 29, Austrian soldiers, who were to escort the Ottoman 
representatives, arrived at Niš. Upon arriving, Zülfikar and the delegation set off a 
second time towards Vienna, and having passed the Hasan Pasha fort, they reached 
Smederevo (Semendire) on September 4.20 Four days later, on September 8, they 
were at Belgrade, where the Austrians, on the pretext of replenishing their 
provisions, compelled Zülfikar and Mavrocordato to see the celebrations for the 
capture of the city on September 6/7.21 Zülfikar first refused entering Belgrade, 
asserting that they wanted to continue on their way and spend the night at Zemun, a 
small town on the other side of the Danube across Belgrade. Antonio Carafa, the 
commissary general of Leopold who was at Belgrade at that time, sent one of his 
lieutenants with two-hundred soldiers and invited Zülfikar and his men to the feast 
organized in their honor. Only then Zülfikar did accept joining the feast himself, 
and he stipulated that his men should cross the Danube while he was in the city; the 
Habsburgs agreed to his offer. Having left Belgrade, it took thirty-five days for 
Zülfikar and his men to get to the mansion of Potendorf, where they arrived on 
October 14. During their presence in the Habsburg lands, this mansion outside of 
Vienna was home to the Ottomans. 
During the journey from Belgrade to Potendorf, Carafa continuously asked 
Zülfikar the reasons behind their visit. Zülfikar, who denied giving information until 
he and his men arrived at Potendorf, handed over the letter written by the Grand 
Vizier to the deputy of the Emperor only after he had arrived safely. Having learned 
that Zülfikar and Mavrocordato were authorized to carry out peace negotiations in 
the name of the Ottoman Sultan, Leopold informed22 his Polish and Venetian allies 
(in accordance with the alliance treaty that had formed the Holy League between 
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them in 1684)23 that they could prepare their clauses.  On December 31, 1688, the 
Ottoman delegates were apprised by Carafa of the decision taken at the Habsburg 
court; they were told that the meeting would be held with the Emperor and that 
thereafter the peace talks would start.24 The next day Zülfikar notified Carafa of his 
contentment and requested the announcement of the certain date of the meeting as 
soon as possible. 
Before the meeting with Leopold was held, the representative rank and status of 
Zülfikar Efendi came on the scene as a disputation between the Ottomans and the 
Holy League members. Arguing that the rank of an Ottoman envoy would greatly 
matter at the Habsburg court may not be an overstatement. It has already been 
explained above how, since the commencement of the political, diplomatic and 
military competition between the two Empires roughly from the concurrent rise of 
Süleyman the Lawgiver to the Ottoman throne and Charles V to the Ottoman 
throne, a symbolic war accompanied the war on the battlefield.25 However, one may 
argue that, at the given time (1689), the Habsburgs’ attention on the status of 
Zülfikar as an Ottoman envoy did not arise out of the Habsburgs’ caution not to 
humiliate a strong, old and redoubtable enemy. On the contrary, it most likely 
stemmed from the remarkable achievements that clearly altered the balance between 
the two Empires to the advantage of the Habsburgs, who apparently did not want to 
overesteem a weakened challenger.26 Kara Mehmet Pasha, who had visited Vienna 
after the Treaty of Vasvar, was welcomed and shown excessive respect and 
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hospitability by the Emperor. As he was instructed, Mehmed Pasha had kissed the 
Emperor on his chest and the Emperor had kissed him on his shoulders.27 Kara 
Mehmed Pasha himself and Evliya Çelebi, who was within Kara Mehmed Pasha’s 
entourage, both recorded that the Habsburgs had amply paid for all of their 
expenditures.28 Now, the turning tide of fortunes had predictably decreased the 
prestige of the Ottoman envoys in the eyes of the Habsburgs.  
On January 20, 1689, Carafa sent his response to the letter of Zülfikar and 
reported the message of the Polish and Venetian representatives, who wanted to 
know whether Zülfikar had letter of credentials (itimadnâme) authorizing him to 
deliver the Sultans’ terms and letters to Warsaw and Venice.29 The next day, 
Zülfikar dispatched a short letter to Carafa and expressed that he had letter of 
credentials as well as clauses to be declared to the Poles and Venetians. 
The letter delivered to Zülfikar and Mavrocordato on January 22, 1689, finally 
approved the meeting with the Emperor at the Habsburg court. In the letter 
delivered by Leopold’s dolmetscher Lachowiz, Carafa told Zülfikar that the letter 
written by the Grand Vizier was authorizing him as a plenipotentiary (me’zun ve 
murahhas) representative but not a grand ambassador, which was a different – 
higher – rank. Thus, Zülfikar would be considered as a secondary rank delegate at 
the court.30 Zülfikar’s request to send a messenger to Istanbul after the meeting was 
denied on the dubious pretext that allowing him to do so would necessitate the same 
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for Polish and Venetian envoys.31 As one will observe throughout the narration of 
Zülfikar, the dispatching of a courier to provide communication with the Ottoman 
Palace was going to be a major point of disputation between Zülfikar and the 
Habsburg delegates. Obviously, having advanced deep into the former Ottoman 
possessions with little difficulty and not seeing any signs of recovery on the 
Ottoman part, Leopold first wanted to listen to the proposal of Zülfikar and then 
fully benefit from the situation by keeping his most recent conquests in his hand—
to which the Ottoman delegates would remain oblivious if they agreed to sign a 
treaty under uti possidetis. 
 
3.2.1 At the Habsburg Court 
On February 10, 1689, Zülfikar and Mavrocordato finally appeared before the 
Habsburg court. Leopold had sent his own carriage for them, and Zülfikar notes that 
the people who wanted to see them had rushed into the court. Mustafa Aga carried 
the letter over his head, his body slightly bent, and Zülfikar, after kissing the letter, 
left it next to the Emperor.32 Zülfikar started to talk after receiving permission, and 
he quickly declared the new Sultan’s goodwill to maintaining the friendship of their 
predecessors.33  
Leopold said that the Habsburgs did not wish this war to happen and that they 
had always struggled to remain loyal to the treaty (Vasvar) with the Ottomans. He 
added that their fulfillments since the beginning of the war in 1683 were God's 
present to them for their allegiance to the peace. In response to the Sultan's 
declaration of good intentions, he said that they too wished for the well-being of the 
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people, and he concluded his speech by saying that he had appointed delegates for 
peace negotiations to start.34  
Indeed, having heard about the decision of a Hungarian campaign from Istanbul, 
Leopold sent an envoy to the Ottoman capital. When the German envoy Albert von 
Caprara visited the Sublime Porte in 1682 to maintain peace, the Grand Vizier Kara 
Mustafa Pasha stipulated unacceptable conditions in order to block renewal of 
peace, demanding that new castles on the border be destroyed and that tribute be 
paid to the Uyvar region as compensation for runaway war prisoners.  
Unsurprisingly, the German envoy did not welcome these demands, and Leopold 
started negotiations in Europe to form an alliance against the Ottomans that ended 
with the formation of the Holy League in 1684.35  
The peace talks between the Ottomans and the allies were to be performed in 
more than ten gatherings, but the main rounds of talks were held in seven meetings 
during the winter and spring of 1689. The first meeting was held in order for each 
involved party to express its general opinions and intentions. As one may observe in 
the records of Zülfikar, during the talks Zülfikar adopted a resolute manner to 
protect the dignity of the Sultan, who was ruling an Empire that for centuries had 
followed through with its initiatives in Central Europe without menace of an equally 
powerful political entity in the region.  
 
3.3 Peace Talks With Representatives 
The negotiations on February 10, 1689, started with disagreements about 
whether the delegates possessed genuine letters of credentials. Zülfikar notes that he 
did not declare his clauses to the Polish and Venetian delegates because he doubted 
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whether they were plenipotentiary representatives authorized to perform talks in the 
name of their masters. Even though a Venetian envoy introduced his paper 
substantiating his permission and authority, it was understood that the Polish king 
had not sent a fully authorized envoy.  In order not to lose time, Zülfikar proposed 
that the Austrians and Venetians start negotiations before the arrival of the 
authorized envoy from Warsaw.  Nevertheless, the allies were firmly and 
unanimously committed to participating in the talks all together, and Zülfikar could 
not change their minds. Without further developments, the second stage came to an 
end.36  
3.3.1 The Terms of the Ottomans  
In the next meeting on February 15, Zülfikar finally had the chance to open 
talks. The Ottomans had two separate proposals putting forth different conditions. 
The first proposal stipulated a permanent peace, according to which both Austrians 
and Venetians had to return some parts of the territories they captured; the second 
proposal was an interim truce stipulating that each party would keep its acquisitions 
till the end of the truce. Transylvania, a vassal of the Sultan, was to be restored to its 
former situation and pay its tribute to the Ottomans under the common protection of 
the Ottoman Sultan and the Habsburg Emperor. In addition, in case they preferred 
signing an interim peace, the allies had to allow the Ottomans to communicate and 
deliver support to the still uncaptured forts, which remained within the new 
Habsburg possessions.37 Although the Imperials advanced to the Bulgarian border 
in the Balkans, several Ottoman strongholds continued to defend themselves within 
Habsburg borders. This last clause, in particular, pertained to the Habsburgs. 
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Neither the Habsburgs nor the Venetians answered Zülfikar’s terms or commented 
on the pretext of the Polish envoy’s absence. 
Zülfikar tried to persuade the Habsburg and Venetian delegates to talk in the 
name of the Poles too, (lest the negotiations be postponed again), but he couldn't 
convince them. However, he was able to declare the conditions for the Poles; 
according to his proposal, the Poles would keep their acquisitions in hand but they 
had to agree destruction of Kamaniça Castle(Kamanietz).38 
 
3.3.2 The Anglo-Dutch Mediation 
Previously, after arriving at Vienna, Zülfikar had sent a letter to the Dutch 
representative of the English King William III in Vienna,39 asking to talk about his 
mediation during the upcoming peace talks. The Dutch representative, who at the 
time declined Zülfikar, later came and visited the Ottoman delegates in Potendorf 
once he had received a letter from the Hague reporting the Ottoman Sultan's 
sanction for the Dutch to work as peacemaker in Vienna. As is shown below, this 
mediation between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs was not simply a friendly effort 
to reconcile the two Empires, but a necessity for the good of Anglo-Dutch existence 
in Western Europe and their interests in the Levant. 
The repercussions of the wars in Western Europe in the last quarter of the 
seventeenth century, the economic competition in the Levant, and the connection 
between them exemplify the ever-intensifying international interactions of the time. 
It should first be emphasized that despite being Dutch and being called ‘the Dutch’ 
by Zülfikar, the ‘Dutch’ envoy was an agent of the English King William III (1689-
1702). When Louis declared war on the Palatinate only two weeks after the fall of 
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Belgrade in September 1688, the English King was James II, a Catholic ruler, who 
would remain neutral according to Louis’s calculation. Only five months after the 
French King’s declaration of war on Leopold (in February 1689), William ascended 
to the throne. William III, a Protestant ruler, was also the Stadtholder (the hereditary 
and crowned head of the state of the Dutch Republic) and, thus, was simultaneously 
benefiting from the English and the Dutch. Without losing any time, William III 
joined Leopold in the Grand Alliance against the French.40 Since the Grand Alliance 
was not strong enough to meet incoming French armies without Leopold’s forces, 
the Emperor should have been freed from his occupation against the Ottomans in 
Eastern Europe. 
Meanwhile, the English, Dutch and French were fighting another war in the 
Levant, an economic competition to maximize their benefit from the Ottoman 
capitulations.41 When Louis attempted to employ a Scottish regiment in his relief 
force that helped the Venetians in Candia in 1669, it caused the English king 
Charles II to mobilize his diplomats to thwart employment of this regiment against 
the Ottomans. Both rulers had a common anxiety: the moment that the Ottomans 
realized who was helping to the Venetians, it would first and foremost damage their 
economic interests in the Levant.42 In fact, until the end of the third quarter of the 
seventeenth century it was the Dutch who took the biggest share from the Levant 
trade. But from the beginning of the last quarter of the seventeenth century on, the 
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French and English began to increase their shares, thanks to the renewed 
capitulations of the former in 1673 and the latter in 1675.  
In short, in addition to being a struggle to restore their economic leadership in 
the Levant, the Anglo-Dutch mediation in Vienna spearheaded by Stadtholder 
English King William III was an attempt to  
…detach, by a mediated peace, the Austrian Habsburgs from their Holy 
League allies and their ongoing and intermittently successful counter-
offensive against the Ottomans in time to throw the weight of their best 
troops and best generals into the struggle of the Grand Alliance against the 
hegemonic design of Louis XIV.43 
  
Naturally the enterprise was launched by the English and the Dutch, not the 
Ottomans. As early as 1687, seeing the benefits which might accrue to English trade 
and commerce, the English ambassador in the Ottoman capital had made a 
suggestion to his King for English mediation between the Sultan and the Emperor, 
but it was rejected in the Cabinet.44 In the autumn of 1688, the Dutch envoy in 
Istanbul reported The Hague's friendship and allegiance to the Ottoman Sultan and 
requested the permission of Süleyman III for a Dutch delegate to work as a 
peacemaker between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs, and the Sultan gave his 
permission. It should be emphasized in advance that, despite the permission given 
by the Sultan, King William’s agents (who were replaced several times in Vienna 
during 1689-1693 period) could not alter the course of the negotiations, which soon 
turned out to be inconclusive after only three months.  
William’s agents’ made a proposal to the Emperor to mediate between him and 
the Sultan on September 20, 1688.45 The Habsburg envoys did not allow the 
Emperor to talk to Zülfikar for a couple of months, most likely because if the 
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envoys were allowed to talk to the Emperor then they might have heard about the 
advance of the French, which would have undercut the Austrians’ strategy of 
keeping the Ottoman delegation out of contact with the Sultan. When they finally 
came together, William’s representative delivered his permission, and Zülfikar 
asserted that they would accept the mediation as long as the Emperor welcomed it.46  
In their talks with Zülfikar, the mediators showed themselves to be supporters of 
the Austrian side. They reminded Zülfikar of the superiority of the Habsburg armies 
against the Ottomans on all fronts. According to them, the Habsburgs' occupation 
with the French in Western Europe was not a heavy burden on the military 
resources of Leopold since all German princes, along with Sweden, Denmark, Spain 
and England, had united against Louis XIV.  
Before the Habsburg representatives officially declared their clauses, the Dutch 
gave an outline to Zülfikar. Leopold demanded all of the Balkan territories which 
were originally connected to the Hungarian crown before the Ottoman conquests in 
Central Europe, extending as far as Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria. Contrary to earlier 
expressed Ottoman clauses, Erdel (Transylvania) was excluded from the 
Habsburgs’ conditions since, from Habsburg’s point of view, the Imperial army had 
established its control in the region and the population had declared their content.47  
Zülfikar’s confidence about the strength of his master was high; he said that the 
Sultan had innumerable sources from which he could conscript fresh forces, 
regardless of the condition.48 However, one may argue that the mediators had 
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justifiable arguments with regard to developments of the last few years on the battle 
fronts, which mainly served Leopold.49 It was hard for the Dutch to offer what 
Zülfikar expected from them, a nation which had been in good relations with the 
Sultans.   
William’s representatives kept coming and going to the Habsburg capital but 
they never produced the outcomes desired by the English and the Dutch, whose 
priority was Louis XIV. Colin Heywood put forth several explanations for the 
failure of Anglo-Dutch diplomacy in Vienna: 
…amongst the most significant may be mentioned the uncertain and lengthy 
lines of communication which hindered effective diplomacy; mutual 
Ottoman-Habsburg intransigence and bad faith in dealing with ‘infidels’; the 
victory of the ‘easterners’ at the Vienna court in the policy struggles which 
went on continuously around the emperor; the ascendancy of France at the 
Porte and…the frequent failure by English and Dutch diplomats in the field 
to implement what was supposed to be common Anglo-Dutch policy.50 
  
In the fourth meeting the envoys exchanged their letters of credential. The 
Habsburg representatives gave to Zülfikar the authorization letter by Leopold, 
which he had originally issued to his representatives Kinsky and Starhemberg on 
February 27, 1689, and in which he had announced to all German princes that he 
gave permission to the aforementioned names to carry out peace negotiations. The 
fourth meeting, too, came to an end without any discussion on the peace conditions. 
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The Habsburgs, for a third time, did not allow the Ottoman representatives to send a 
messenger to Istanbul.51 
 
3.4 Negotiations Come to a Deadlock 
The fifth meeting on March 2 was supposed to be the first stage of discussions 
of the terms. Zülfikar’s impatience gradually grew as the Habsburg delegation, 
instead of commencing negotiations, brought forward preconditions for peace. 
Whatever the Emperor’s actual ambitions were, it was obvious that one of his 
purposes in bringing forward these conditions was to plan to secure a treaty that 
would compensate his financial and territorial losses as well as his dignity in 
Europe. The preconditions included payment of war expenditures and the handing 
over of Imre Thököly, whom the Habsburg representatives portrayed as the catalyst 
behind the ongoing warfare and whom the Habsburg argued should be returned by 
the Ottomans since he was a former vassal of the Habsburgs.52 Zülfikar firmly 
asserted the inappropriateness of these demands from the Ottoman point of view, 
refusing to discuss the payment of war expenditures and adding that the peace talks 
were not convened to talk about Thököly’s fate.53  
With the combined support of the French King and the Grand Vizier Kara 
Mustafa Pasha, Imre Thököly had gradually transformed himself into one of the 
main figures of the anti-Habsburg movement during the second half of the 1670s. 
The main reason behind the anti-Habsburg movement in Hungary was Leopold’s 
ever-intensifying repressive and intolerant policy with regards to Hungarians. 
Thököly, the son of a Calvinist nobleman “whose estates had been seized following 
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the magnate conspiracy,”54 gradually became the leader of the movement and began 
storming the Habsburg frontier in Hungary.55 Leopold’s attempts to isolate Thököly 
by sending four envoys to the Ottoman capital did not yield any results.56  
In 1689/90, handing over Thököly to the Habsburgs would have been a major 
strategic mistake since he was the only tool that the Ottomans had to set their claims 
to Transylvania. The Ottomans continued charging Thököly in the campaigns of the 
1690s; as observed in the muhimme registers from 1690 on, Imre Thököly, 
appointed King of Hungary (Orta Macar), was indispensible for the legitimization 
of the Ottoman Empire’s claims in Transylvania. In the orders sent to the princes in 
Transylvania, the Sultan declared Thököly’s appointment as King and promised 
religious freedom to those who obeyed him.57  Thus, Thököly by no means could 
have been a pre-condition for the Ottomans, and in fact, the Habsburgs’ demand for 
Thököly itself was enough to stop negotiations in Zülfikar’s mind. Two days later, 
King William’s Dutch representative visited Zülfikar and reiterated that as long as 
they didn’t agree on the pre-conditions laid out by the Habsburgs they wouldn’t be 
able to conclude a peace treaty. But the Ottoman envoys were willing to deny these 
preconditions even at the cost of a peace treaty.58 
From the paper he sent to King William’s representative after this meeting, it is 
understood that Zülfikar was almost convinced that the Emperor did not intend to 
sign a peace treaty. Zülfikar emphatically told the Dutch envoy to notify the 
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Habsburg delegates that the Sultan’s conditions could not be changed or modified, 
and he added that carrying out the talks under the current conditions was useless. 
The Dutch mediator advised Zülfikar to demand another assembly, and while 
Zülfikar followed this suggestion, his hope for a treaty in Vienna was already lost 
before exchanging any peace terms,59 although it had been only six weeks since he 
had met the Emperor. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
STRUGGLE IN VAIN 
 
 
4.1 Terms of the Emperor 
In two days the representatives came together for a sixth time. Finally, the 
Habsburgs handed over their peace terms on the condition that Thököly would be 
the primary issue to be settled in the aftermath of a possible peace treaty. The 
clauses were as follows. 
1-The lands Ottomans wanted to be returned in the occasion of a peace treaty 
were already originally possessions of the Holy Roman Emperor and the 
Hungarian crown. They can not be returned. Besides, the Sultan shall 
abandon the Bosnian, Serbian and Bulgarian lands, which were a part of the 
Hungarian crown since the ancient times.  
2- Both sides shall be allowed to construct castles in their possessions as 
long as the security of the region and population necessitated.  
3- Both sovereigns shall provide security within their borders. The Sultan 
himself shall punish the frontier raiders and Tatars if they attack to the 
Habsburg possessions.  
4- The enemies and disloyal subjects of the Sultan and the Emperor shall not 
be protected by the other side. 
5- Tradesman from both sides, operating in lands and seas of each other shall 
be exempted from all kinds of taxation. The emperor shall be allowed to send 
representatives to appropriate locations in the Ottoman Empire and the 
Sultan shall grant them the same prerogatives granted to the other non-
Muslim (zimmi) and protected (müste’men) subjects. 
6- The captives on both sides shall be exchanged.  
7- The protection of Jerusalem shall be returned to the Catholic priests from 
the Orthodoxies. Catholic pilgrims shall be allowed to travel in the region 
and performance of Catholic rituals in the district shall be free and 
undisturbed.
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8- The envoys of both sides shall be welcomed and esteemed in conformity 
with their rank and status.  
9- The Sultan shall also seek consent of Polish King and the Venetian Doge 
and conclude independent peace treaties with them.  
10- Boğdan (Moldavia) shall be emptied.1 
 
Predictably, Zülfikar turned down all the terms. He again invited the Dutch 
representative, who could render little to help the Ottomans except listen to their 
complaints, and informed the Sultan that there would be no need to sign a peace 
treaty. He expressed the inconvenience of the Hapsburg’s bringing forward of 
additional terms related to the Ottoman subjects as well as the taxation of the 
tradesmen and stated that he was in Vienna to negotiate on nothing but territorial 
matters. Having met with the Habsburg envoys, the Dutch sent a letter to 
Zülfikar saying that the Habsburg representatives, too, wanted both to listen to 
and have a written copy of Zülfikar’s counter-arguments.2 
By mid-March, representatives met a seventh time in order for Zülfikar to 
deliver his response to the peace terms announced by the Habsburgs. Zülfikar 
stated that a peace between two rulers could be affirmed in either two distinct 
manners: Either, the Hapsburgs and the Ottomans would sign a permanent treaty 
which would console each side by assuring a satisfactory share for each side, or 
conversely, they would endorse an interim peace at least for the sake of subjects’ 
comfort and well-being, allowing each side to keep their most recent 
acquisitions in their hand until the end of the truce. He added that the Sultan 
would show consent for either situation.3 Zülfikar went on, however, the terms 
laying claim on almost the entire Balkans were by no means negotiable because 
the Sultan was already demanding restoration of pre-war conditions in various 
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regions. Therefore, they could only negotiate on an interim peace. He added 
that, no need to assert again, the Sultan was firm on his terms for a permanent 
peace.4 In the same meeting, having argued a few minor details, Zülfikar noted 
that peace treaties between belligerent nations would always take into 
consideration the contentment of each side. He declared again his determination 
to sign a peace treaty, but it only if the document satisfied each party’s 
expectations. For the Sultan, it meant the return of Buda. 
On March 24, 1689, Antoni Carafa visited Zülfikar and notified him of the 
Emperor’s answer to the conditions stipulated by the Ottomans during the last 
meeting. At the last meeting Zülfikar had stressed that as long as the Emperor 
would not open the roads to the Ottoman castles that were still defending 
themselves within the Habsburg territories; the Sultan would not agree to any 
treaty. These castles included strongholds such as Kanije (Nagykanizsa), 
Szigetvar, Temeşvar (Timisoara) and Varad (Oradea) as well as a number of 
less significant fortifications in and around Hungary. Moreover, Zülfikar had 
requested that Erdel (Transylvania) be restored to its former situation. Carafa, 
who was as resolute as Zülfikar in satisfying this master, responded resolutely 
that the aforementioned castles were too far within the recently captured 
Habsburg possessions and that their fall was to be highly expected. He added 
that the fact that Erdel was completely under control of the Emperor and Eflak 
(Walachia) had already declared its subjection to the Hapsburgs, the Sultan’s 
insistence on such conditions was entirely impracticable. Furthermore, Habsburg 
forces wintering along the Bulgarian border at Niš were only hours away from 
Bosnia. Carafa, mentioning the disarray in Anatolia and Rumelia and the bad 
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state of the Sultan’s army as opposed to the advantageous position of the 
Emperor against the French armies, pointed out the weak state of the Sultan 
against the Emperor. That is to say, the terms laid down by Zülfikar were 
impractical.5 
In fact, the historical data confirms the Austrians’ reiterations of tumult in 
Rumelia and Anatolia at that time. Cengiz Orhonlu, who examined the period’s 
existing muhimme registers, revealed that the years extending from 1691 to 1696 
marked an era of large-scale social mobilization in the Ottoman provinces.6 During 
1687 and 1688 the Habsburg armies had marched into Ottoman Balkan territories 
almost without a fight. As mentioned above, the Christian population in this region 
willingly joined the Habsburg army, sometimes without waiting a call by the 
newcomers.7 After a while, although most of the population took refuge again in 
Ottoman lands after facing Jesuit proselytizing, a remarkable number of non-
Muslim population started to immigrate to Austrian territories, reaching Austrian 
mainland at times.8 Correspondingly, throughout Anatolia and Syria, where the 
number of security troops was far smaller than the protection of the subjects 
necessitated, banditry was rampant and forced many peasants to abandon their 
villages.9 As Orhonlu concludes, in the following five years, 1691 to 1696, this 
depopulation forced the Ottoman’s central government to implement a resettlement 
project for certain nomadic tribes in order to support these now deserted regions.  
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4.2 Zülfikar’s Demand to Leave  
It is necessary to emphasize, however, that Zülfikar, be he informed or not about 
the circumstances, - irrespective of how unrealistic they were - could not change his 
demands without further instructions from his master as such a digression would be 
punishable by death. Nonetheless, one may agree that the Emperor was 
correspondingly too optimistic. His ever-growing Balkan aspirations hindered him 
from being “less maximalistic and more realistic,”10 Nevertheless, when considered 
within the circumstances of the war, the Habsburgs’ refusal to return the castles and 
their disinterest in signing a peace treaty that would return some of the captured 
territories to the Ottomans was quite understandable. It is quite likely that when war 
began Leopold did not expect his armies to progress into Balkans with that such 
ease. Now his achievements had increased his resolve to keep all his acquisitions in 
his hand, although restoring his hereditary right within Hungary was his ultimate 
goal in the formation of the Holy League. Indeed, considering how he suffered a 
disadvantageous treaty in Vasvar after defeating the Ottoman army there and the 
fact that Kara Mustafa Pasha had rejected all his proposals to extend the peace 
before the siege of Vienna, one should not blame Leopold for being so devoted to 
suing for such a broadly advantageous peace. That is to say, within these conditions 
Zülfikar and the Habsburg representatives could not manage to sign a reasonable 
peace treaty, which would persuade both sides.  
During the following days, the Dutch envoy visited Zülfikar and Mavrocordato 
three times and informed them that their departure papers would be prepared 
quickly and they would be allowed take their depart soon. First however, the Dutch 
envoy recommended that Zülfikar and Mavrocordato should inform the Habsburg 
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representatives if they had at all altered their original conditions for peace.11 Not 
surprisingly, Zülfikar was resolute in his demands. 
Meanwhile, Zülfikar began to think that conclusion of a peace treaty which 
would include terms favored by both sides was impossible. He sent one of his men 
to the Bohemian chancellor Count Ulrich Kinsky, one of the representatives of the 
Emperor at the Habsburg court at the time, and requested permission to return 
Ottoman lands. Count Kinsky countered by informing Zülfikar that the Polish envoy 
was on his way to Vienna. He offered to commence talks with the Venetian 
representatives until the Polish delegate arrived. Zülfikar accepted this request. 
Earlier, on February 15, the Ottomans had already expressed in general terms the 
conditions to be stipulated to the Venetians. Zülfikar sent another courier to the 
Venetian representatives and requested them to announce their terms.12 
 
4.3 Terms of Venetians 
In early April, the Venetian envoy sent their clauses to Zülfikar Pasha. 
Foremost, Venice desired for the island of Eğriboz (Euboea) to be evacuated. In the 
four years between 1688 and 1692, the Venetians had already managed to capture 
Mora and wished to secure the hold of several strategic points along the Aegean and 
Adriatic Sea in order to be able to defend Mora. Like the Habsburgs, they asked 
permission to build castles where security necessitated. The Ottomans should have 
abolished the tax they were taking from Venice for Zaklise (Zakynthos) island as 
well disclaim the yearly tribute paid by Venice to the Sultan.13 Zülfikar was indeed 
surprised at the Venetians’ demands of territory and castles in light of the Sultan’s  
earlier rejection of the Emperor’s similar demands. It was not apparent to Zülfikar 
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of the unlikely success of a peace treaty. Nonetheless, with a last bit of hope, he 
requested to hear the clauses of the Polish envoy who had finally arrived at 
Vienna.14 Soon the Polish envoy handed over to Zülfikar Pasha his letter of 
credentials which was signed on March 6 in Warsaw.15 
Before Zülfikar Pasha and the Polish representatives started to negotiate again, 
Zülfikar sent a letter to the Dutch envoy in order to reassert that the conditions 
expressed in the name of the Sultan could not be changed within the existing 
circumstances. He emphasized that the demands of the Venetians were neither 
agreeable nor negotiable.16 Zülfikar had no doubt that the Habsburgs and the 
Venetians were not eager to sign a treaty and instead wished to stall negotiations. In 
his response, the Dutch representative tried once again to encourage Zülfikar to 
continue negotiations and reply to the Venetians. Zülfikar, despite the whole mental 
reluctance agreed replying to the Venetians, though he did not express much more 
than his earlier remarks to the Dutch representative and again stressed the 
impracticality of the Venetian terms.17 
 
4.4 Terms of the Poles 
Zülfikar Pasha was by now convinced that staying any longer in Vienna was 
pointless. He continued sending letters to the Dutch envoy and requested from him 
to do all he could do to expedite the issuing of departure papers from the Habsburg 
court. As Zülfikar was attempting to depart from Vienna a minor Polish envoy 
arrived at the court although the main representative was still yet to come. Zülfikar 
Pasha sent a letter to the then present envoy in Vienna and said that the time given 
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to the Poles to dispatch the grand representative (baş elçi) to the Habsburg capital 
was now over and even passed by several days, thus. It was now time for the Poles 
to declare their clauses. The Polish delegate agreed to respond, but only upon the 
written delivery of the terms of the Ottomans. Zülfikar posted the letter on April 5.18 
The same day Polish envoy dispatched his king’s clauses starting with an annotation 
at the very beginning, laying down the deliberation of former problems between the 
Ottomans and the Poles as a pre-condition.19 
1-Previously the Poles used to protect the Kazakhs, while the Ottomans used 
to protect the Tatars. According to the peace treaty signed in 1489 at the time 
of Bayezid II, Ottomans were compensating the damage done by the Tatars, 
whereas the Poles were paying for Kazakh’s. As their access to the Black 
Sea was blocked by the Ottomans, the Kazakhs united with the Tatars and 
began fighting against the Poles, bringing about great losses and sorrow to 
the Polish king during the last thirty years. In concordance with Suleyman 
the Lawgiver’s demands from the Poles in the sixteenth century for Tatars’ 
destructive raids to be compensated, now, the Sultan shall compensate the 
losses of the Poles inflicted by the Kazakh raids. 
2-The Turcic people and tribes living in between Özi and Danube shall be 
transferred to the southern Danube or to Anatolia. The sultan shall stop all 
his connection and interest in Crimea and on Russian territories as well as on 
the land between the Danube and Özi Rivers. Wallachia and Moldavia shall 
be also delivered to the Poles. 
3- The protection of Jerusalem shall be returned to the Catholic priests.  
4- The Christian subjects shall be allowed to toll church bells, buy land and 
build new churches. Whoever takes refuge at a church shall be safe. 
5- Captives shall be released. 
6- Podolia and Kamianets shall be returned to the Polish King with their 
subjects.  
7- The Sultan shall renounce his interests on Ukraine and Kazakhs.20 
 
It was obvious that the desperate condition of the Sultan increased the Poles’ 
appetite to derive excessive benefit from the negotiations. From Zülfikar’s point of 
view, the conditions stipulated by the Poles did not even deserve an answer.21 
Zülfikar waited until the next meeting with the Poles to reply to their demands and 
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meanwhile again attempt to take his leave from Vienna as he was not eager to carry 
on peace talks in the campaign season. In his next letter to the Emperor’s delegates 
Zülfikar declared his desire to hold a last meeting with all of the envoys in Vienna 
to terminate the negotiations.22 This request sparked a change among the 
Hapsburg’s diplomat. For the first time the Habsburgs agreed to meet with Zülfikar 
without the Polish and Venetian representatives. Zülfikar agreed the offer. On April 
13, the Ottoman and Habsburg envoys assembled one more time to listen to each 
other. Zülfikar stated that it was the sixth month of their presence in Vienna and 
added, while regular communication between a ruler and his representatives in a 
peace negotiation should have been a customary, their request to send a messenger 
to the Sultan was denied and they turned out to be de facto prisoners in Potendorf. 
Additionally, the campaign season was drawing near and there was always 
possibility of unpredictable developments happening along the battle fronts, 
necessitating communication with the Sultan.23 Zülfikar now had put aside the 
treaty and focused upon acquiring permission papers to leave. These requests were, 
however, ignored.  
 
4.5 Zülfikar’s Proposal to the Poles to Sign an Independent Treaty 
On April 9, Zülfikar had sent a letter to the grand Polish envoy and reminded 
him that they were waiting for the terms of Polish king. The Polish envoy, who had 
been performing talks with the Habsburg delegates in Vienna since his arrival in the 
city, finally met with Zülfikar. Zülfikar began the negotiations by mentioning the 
friendship between the two states in previous decades. He said that the Sultan had 
charged the Crimean Khan and his raiders to assist to the Polish King against the 
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attacks of the Swedes, Muscovite, and Rakoczi, the king of Transylvania. The 
Polish envoy was however indifferent to the Ottoman’s appeals of past friends. He 
said that the existence of Tatar raiders in Polish territories did not always originate 
from friendly motivations and stressed his king’s demands for compensation for the 
damage inflicted by the Tatar raids. Zülfikar, most probably relying on the former 
friendly relations, attempted putting into practice another strategy, and aimed at 
isolating Poles from the Habsburgs, by expressing that the Poles could take Podolia 
and Ukraine only if the Emperor accepts the Sultan’s terms. According to Zülfikar, 
the Holy League treaty benefited much to the Habsburgs, whereas Poles gained 
nothing. He even offered them a separate peace if they come to the terms. But it 
proved to be inconclusive.24 
On April 12, it was now the Venetians’ turn to listen to Zülfikar’s answer to 
their previously delivered terms. The Venetians repeated that they would sign a 
peace treaty on the condition that each side would keep their own territorial 
acquisitions. The Venetian envoy stressed that without taking the hold of the castle 
of Benefşe, strategically the most important defensive castle in Mora; they wouldn’t 
sign a treaty. Zülfikar was amazed that Venice, a small political entity, was 
expecting the mighty Sultan to hand over castles to them. Zülfikar also refused the 
clause setting the border in northern Greece over the Bosnian Mountains since a 
mountainous border could be determined only under the observation of the locals 
familiar with the geography. Otherwise, such a vague clause would most likely only 
cause trouble again 
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One must be reminded again that throughout the negotiations the allies were 
almost completely convinced about the Sultan’s insufficiency to maintain the war. 
Echoing the Habsburg delegates, the Venetian representative, too, reminded 
Zülfikar of the Sultan’s struggles on the battlefield. He adds that the clauses, 
however, were still away from satisfying the honor of the Ottoman Empire.25 In the 
end, talks with the Venetians ended without any agreement and has only been 
another stage of the fruitless assemblies in Vienna. 
 
4.6 Habsburgs Offer Leaving Balkan Territories 
On June 17, Zülfikar Pasha came together with the chancellor, Count Ulrich 
Kinsky, and general minister Count Ernst Rüdiger Starhamberg in a supposedly 
confidential meeting. First Zülfikar emphasized that the terms declared until then by 
the Habsburgs were by no means acceptable and that they would be undoubtedly 
rejected by the Sultan. Zülfikar asked again to the Emperor’s deputies whether any 
of their clauses were negotiable. For the first time since the beginning of the talks in 
Vienna one of the parties modified their clauses to less maximistic margins. Kinsky 
and Starhamberg announced that the Emperor could sacrifice his hereditary rights 
on the other parts of the Hungarian crown, provided that a peace would be signed on 
the condition that every castle under the control of the Habsburgs at the time and 
their territories would remain to the Emperor, including Transylvania and still 
uncaptured Ottoman castles within the Habsburg territories. To convince Zülfikar, 
the Habsburg representatives mentioned circumstances of the Ottomans one more 
time emphasizing that Russia, not yet a member of the Holy League, had started 
attacks on Crimea, exacerbating the already unfavorable state of the Ottoman 
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Empire.26 They reminded the combat between the Emperor and the French king was 
not yet a thorn in the Habsburg’s side since it was not only German soldiers but the 
united forces of the Grand Alliance unified entire against the French King. They 
told to Zülfikar that if he gains the consent of the Emperor, the Emperor could 
persuade the Venetians and the Poles to sign the treaty. Unfortunately, its not 
known precisely what Zülfikar was ordered by the Sultan when he set off for 
Vienna. Assuming that a treaty would be signed if Zülfikar modified his terms to a 
more agreeable degree may not be a fallacy. But one more time he ignored 
everything told by the Habsburgs. The only important outcome of this meeting was 
issue of the permission papers by the Emperor for a messenger to be sent to 
Istanbul.27 
 
4.7 Ottoman Courier Mustafa Aga Goes to Edirne 
On June 19, the Habsburgs finally gave the permission to the Ottomans to 
dispatch a courier, Mustafa Aga, to the Sultan. The next day Mustafa Aga departed 
from Vienna. His journey, although the Habsburgs gave him only fifty days to 
return, lasted more than four months. On the way, the Habsburg general on the 
Ottoman front imprisoned Mustafa Aga in Semendire. Zülfikar had ordered Mustafa 
Aga to post a message from every resting point he stopped. When the papers ceased 
to arrive, Zülfikar understood that he was detained. At that moment, “the imperial 
court was assembled for the election of the Emperor's oldest son Joseph as King of 
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the Romans”28 in Augsburg. Zülfikar send a letter to the deputy of the Emperor in 
Vienna and complained about the situation. Zülfikar noted that Mustafa Aga was 
imprisoned most likely because the Habsburg general, who was supposedly having 
difficulty in providing ammunition and provisions to his limited number of troops, 
did not want the Ottoman courier to notify the Sultan of the dire circumstances on 
the Habsburg side.29 
Mustafa Aga delivered the letter in August. The letter written by Zülfikar 
shortly gave information about the arrival of the Ottoman delegates at the Habsburg 
capital and epitomized the course of the negotiations. In the letter, Zülfikar 
mentioned his own thoughts about why the Emperor might be keeping the Ottoman 
delegates in Vienna by repeatedly postponing a final talk. He thought that Leopold, 
having seen his soldiers advance deep into the Balkans with little difficulty, was 
eager to see whether his armies could progress even deeper into the Ottoman. The 
letter also included information about the situation on the western front of the 
Habsburg Empire where decades of French aggression were not at its most fierce 
level.30 
In the letter Zülfikar attached the terms he had laid during the talks with the 
allies. He, in short, expressed that a possible peace would be an interim one under 
uti possidetis since the Habsburgs purged the possibility of a permanent peace by 
laying claims on the entire Balkan territories. He also stated that the roads of 
Temeşvar, Varad, Yanova and Gyula be opened, and that Erdel be restored to its 
former state as an autonomous principality paying tribute to the Sultan. Also he 
requested that Kanije still defending itself in western Hungary, be exchanged with 
an equally important fortress. Venice would keep its acquisitions, while the Sultan 
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would retain possession of the castle of Benefşe. Furthermore once the peace was 
signed, the borders in both Bosnia and Mora between Venice and the Ottomans 
would be determined decisively under observation of the locals. It is also apparent 
from the letter that Zülfikar was ordered by the Sultan to pursue a peace which 
included former borders between the empires, which, as emphasized above was 
impossible from the Habsburg point of view 31   
Mustafa Aga arrived back at Vienna on October 26, 1689, with news about the 
circumstances on the fronts and renewed instructions. Details of the loses among the 
Ottoman forces along the Habsburg front discouraged the Ottoman delegation, 
whereas news of  the successful resistance in Crimea and along Polish border as 
well as the suppression of the revolts in Anatolia and Rumelia counterbalanced their 
annoyance.32 Indeed, the letter of the Grand vizier had little significance except to 
boost the Ottoman delegates’ confidence by enouncing the successes of the 
Ottoman armies.33 The Grand Vizier commenced his words by praising the solid 
and sapient posture of Zülfikar Pasha against the allies' representatives. He noted 
that Yeğen Osman Pasha was eliminated in the last winter as well as Güdük 
Mehmed Pasha, the Beylerbeyi of Sivas, who stormed Anatolia with his brigand 
troops. The Russian attacks were repulsed, the Venetian fleet was defeated and the 
Bosnian border was protected.34 The Grand vizier also added that the officials in the 
Imperial Court showed a preference for Zülfikar to sue for an interim peace under 
the current conditions. Otherwise, he was ordered to take his leave from Vienna 
immediately.35  
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The letter send by the Grand Vizier to the Emperor's deputy initiated the last 
series of the communication between the Ottoman and allies delegates. The Grand 
Vizier asserted in his letter that the Ottoman envoys dispatched to Vienna were 
plenipotentiary representatives of the Sultan, fully authorized to perform peace talks 
in his name, and urged the Habsburg deputy to either complete the negotiations 
within the terms laid down by Zülfikar or send back the Ottoman delegates without 
further delays.36 After the arrival of Mustafa Aga, Zülfikar Pasha himself had also 
wrote and attached two letters to the Grand Viziers’ and reiterated that the Sultan 
had not modified his former orders with new ones, thus, he would sign a treaty only 
under the original clauses set forth earlier.37  
On October 29, 1689, Zülfikar replied to the Sultan’s letter. Zülfikar’s new 
letter, which included information related to the latest developments in Europe, 
demonstrates that the Ottomans were not oblivious to the developments in early 
modern Europe, as argued in chapter II. During the decades the Ottomans ruled in 
Central Europe they had rarely taken into consideration the possible reactions and 
outcomes of their operations since their strength remained unchallenged for more 
than a century. The letter posted to the Sultan by Zülfikar Pasha from Vienna, 
however, shows that the Ottomans were not blind to the developments and indeed 
observed and examined the linkages fostered by current political transactions in the 
Continent. To emphasize again, the political and military strategies of the Ottoman 
Empire always kept in mind the developments in Europe. For example Zülfikar's 
letter reported the latest developments on the Habsburg-French border, including a 
detail from the war zone, though the document was ignorant of the details 
concerning the circumstances along the Spanish and Dutch frontiers. Furthermore 
                                                 
36
 Mustafa Güler. Zülfikar, 135-137. 
37
 Mustafa Güler. Zülfikar, 137-142. 
 66
the letter included such minutia from the Continent as the election of a Venetian 
noble as the new Pope and the visit of the Russian envoy to the Habsburg court.38 
Now it was obvious that as long as both the Sultan and the Emperor did not 
scale down their expectations and relinquish some of their ambitions - at least for 
the well-being of their subjects – war would continue. During the following months 
the Habsburgs’ manner towards the Ottoman delegation has turned out to be clearly 
intended to delay their departure. Habsburgs made him stay so long that he was not 
an envoy but more of a prisoner from then on. In November, 1689, Kinsky invited 
Zülfikar to another interlocution. Zülfikar responded that they did not have new 
terms and would join further negotiations only if the Habsburgs had themselves new 
terms to be delivered. The next day, Kinsky posted another message and reported 
the astonishment of Leopold at the insistence of the Ottomans on their original 
clauses even though the Imperial forces were so successful both in Western and 
Eastern Europe.  
 
4.8 The Changing Atmosphere of Europe and the Last Attempt for Peace 
Before mentioning the Habsburg’s last attempt to sign a treaty, one should 
survey the changing atmosphere in Europe. For the first time since the war between 
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the Ottomans and the Holy League began, calls for peace had begun to emanate 
throughout Europe. 
 In the late summer of 1689, Pope Innocent XI (1676-1689) lost his life. 
Innocent XI was the most important figure and the mastermind behind the alliance 
treaty of 1684 between the Empire, Poles and Venetians. He incessantly endeavored 
to unite Europe within the largest Catholic boundaries and to drive back Turks from 
Europe. The annexation of Hungary via Imperial armies was going to pave the way 
for a Catholic Europe by providing the possibility for direct intervention into the 
existing sectarian discrepancies there. On his part, it was a cogent reason to support 
the Emperor to regain Hungary. An already known policy of the Ottomans in 
Central Europe was promoting religious divergences at the expense of Papal 
interests. Innocent XI lived long enough to enjoy the fall of Belgrade and died in 
August 1689. In October, Pope Alexander VIII succeeded him. With the new Pope, 
the trend in Europe towards belligerence with the Turks started to gradually give 
way to a desire for peace. In a drastic departure from his predecessor, Alexander 
VIII in his second speech in the presence of the Cardinals and foreign ambassadors 
stated the following related to the Turkish war and ongoing contentions in Europe: 
…The present War with the Turks, in which his Imperial majesty, and the 
Most Serene State of Venice, with their allies, are engaged. In this we are to 
consider, whether it be more conduceable (conducible) to the benefit of 
Christendom, and of the Catholic Church, to continue this War, or to make 
up a peace with these enemies of our religion, as being content of the 
Advantages we have already obtained over them. If the first bethought 
fitting, I here on my part promise to give all the Concurrence to it that lyes 
(lies) in my power. And if the second be found more reasonable, then 
conjoint measures must be taken among the allies, that none of them may for 
their own private advantage, pack up a peace with the Ottomans.39 
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Having brought up benefits of a peace with the Turks while currently enjoying 
an advantageous condition over them, the Pope touched on the warfare between 
Louis and Leopold. Correspondingly, he emphasized that a compromise with France 
would also be to the benefit of the German princes, while the acquisition of 
Hungary would only be a personal gain for the Emperor: 
…considering he (Leopold) is in war with an enemy upon the other side, of 
whom he can gain more, than by a war with France. What this prince gains 
of the Turks, is properly his own, and is immediately joined to the rest of his 
hereditary countries. But what he should acquire upon the French side, 
cannot be his, but would accrew (accrue?) to other Princes of the Empire, 
that lye (lie) upon the Rhine.40 
 
Apparently, after five years of successful campaigns against the Ottomans that 
engendered their downfall in Europe and, at least for the time being, brought 
territorial acquisitions even greater than what was conceived in the beginning of the 
war; the new Pope seemed satisfied. Alexander VIII, indeed, “was friendlier than 
Innocent XI to the French King” and “declined to find money for the Turkish war.” 
Moreover, he “affronted Leopold by declining to adopt a single Habsburg 
nomination in either his first or second ‘honours’ list of new cardinals,” and “Rome 
was no longer in step with Vienna,” which clearly weakened the Emperor’s hand 
against the Ottomans.41 
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4.9 The Grand Viziership of Fazil Mustafa Pasha and His Meeting With 
English Mediator 
When the situation on the battlefield seemed so irreparable for the Ottomans, as 
if to justify Zülfikar’s stress on ‘the tide of fortunes’, another Köprülü Grand Vizier 
gave life to the Sultan’s subjects. Fazil Mustafa Pasha, upon the recommendation of 
the Şeyhuislam to the Sultan, became the Grand Vizier in November, 1689. He 
repealed every extraordinary warfare imposition along with the household taxes laid 
all over the Empire,42 and alleviated the burden on subjects. The next year, he 
moved from Istanbul in July, 1690, in order to retake the city of Niş. Thanks to the 
operations of the united Ottoman army43 in upper Danube the enemy’s supporting 
lines were blocked. The city surrendered after twenty-three days, on September 9, 
1690. Following the conquest of Niş, the Ottomans marched on Semendire 
(Smederevo) and seized it with little difficulty. Fazil Mustafa Pasha’s next goal was 
capturing Belgrade. While he set out for Belgrade, the Habsburgs were already 
occupied with the Nine Years’ War, which facilitated a less burdensome campaign 
for the Ottoman army. The conquest of Belgrade was realized with unexpected ease, 
owing to the explosion of the defender’s ammunition depot on the eighth day of the 
siege, on November 9, 1690. The newly confident next Grand Vizier dispatched an 
army to Esek, unambiguously setting his sights on Western Hungary. But the heavy 
rain allowed them only for a four days siege and the army returned to the capital. 
Support was delivered as far as Temeşvar, which encouraged the Ottomans to 
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restore their control in Transylvania by effectuating the princedom of Thököly 
there, although it was never restored to its former situation. 
While Zülfikar Pasha was still in Vienna, in February 1691 the general of the 
guarding troops in Belgrade sent a report to Istanbul including the intermediation 
request of the English and Dutch negotiators. The Grand Vizier gathered the 
statesmen (vüzerâ), the ‘ulemâ, the Khan as well as agas in the army. They 
concluded that unless the lands occupied following 1683 were returned, war would 
continue to be the as de facto situation between the two sides. 
The same year on June 11, 1691, while Fazil Mustafa Pasha was on the way to 
another campaign he accepted the presence of English negotiator Sir William 
Hussey in Edirne (Adrionaple). Hussey’s existence in Edirne was an extension of 
the Anglo-Dutch mission outlined earlier. Indeed, the Grand Vizier appeared to be 
all set for a treaty. He “wanted to know whether Hussey himself had authority from 
the Emperor to negotiate: in that case he offered to call for ink and paper at once.”44 
Hussey, who was not authorized to sign a treaty, requested permission for his men 
to return to Austria to take new instructions. But he asked the Grand Vizier’s 
thought about a possible peace treaty. Köprülü said “he would judge the 
possibilities of peace in the theatre of warfare”, and that he was “on his way there at 
the head of the Sultan’s army.”45 The Grand Vizier, who refused signing a treaty, 
lost his life on the battlefield from a bullet to the forehead received at the battle of 
Slankamen, on August 19, 1991. In both Istanbul and Vienna, a necessary switch of 
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policies followed the war. For both empires, financing campaigns and feeding 
soldiers turned out to be heavy burdens. The peace treaty took approximately 
another decade to be signed, but the battle at Slankamen marked a decrease in the 
intensity of the combat in Eastern Europe.      
 
4.10 The End of the Talks 
The envoys in Vienna never came together again in a scheduled assembly in the 
Hapsburg capital. Zülfikar’s coerced presence in Vienna completed its fifteenth 
month when the Habsburgs finally delivered them permission papers for their 
departure.46 From these days on Zülfikar did not record the dates properly. Most 
probably at the late summer 1690 they moved to Komorn (Komárom), where they 
would supposedly board a ship and return home. However on the island of Komorn 
the Ottoman delegate were again detained in order to make one final attempt at a 
peace treaty. First the Habsburg Cardinal Kollonich and then a private secretary of 
Leopold paid unexpected visits to the Ottoman envoy in Komorn and declared for 
the last time that Leopold wished to sign a treaty. Zülfikar stressed that they have 
already declared their clauses ad nauseum and would not negotiate these vital 
points. While strictly refusing to negotiate, Zülfikar did make one concession and 
agreed to deliver one last copy of the Ottoman terms.47  
Zülfikar, in short, stipulated that as long as Transylvania and Croatia were not 
restored to their former state the Ottomans would refuse to sign the treaty as the 
new border would have been along the Sava and Danube rivers, leaving the lands in 
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between them to Habsburgs.48 Zülfikar was told that he would be notified of the 
Emperor’s answer within ten days, but the tired negotiators would have to wait until 
mid-February, approximately four months, for the arrival of an answer. 
The response letter was an unexpected inquiry into the validity of the Ottoman 
delegation’s letters of credentials. First, in a bold stroke, Kinsky asked whether 
Zülfikar still had a functioning authorization paper.49 Indeed, regardless of whether 
the Ottomans’ letters of credentials were still in force, there no longer existed an 
atmosphere conducive to negotiations. Zülfikar, as he reports, did not even answer 
this last letter. As of November 6, 1690, Zülfikar had posted five letters50 querying 
why they were still held on Komorn, although none of these queries helped 
ameliorate the circumstances. Habsburgs forced the Ottoman delegation to move 
several other times during the following months but it’s not easy to estimate how 
much time they actually spent at their new residences because he did not record 
date. They continued to reside in Habsburg lands until January, 1692 but without 
meeting or communication according to Zülfikar’s reports.  
The letter on January 19, 1692, from Kinsky had finally ended the captive-like 
situation of the Sultan’s representatives and granted them the permission to leave. 
The letter accused Zülfikar for refusing to negotiate and bringing the talks to 
deadlock, although Cardinal Kollonich and Leopold’s secretary visited him one last 
time in order to attempt to restart peace talks. The most remarkable part of the 
permission letter was the Habsburgs’ confession of why they did not allow the 
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Ottomans to leave. Kinsky declared that they detained them because they wanted to 
alleviate the public pressure on Vienna if a treaty is not signed. The Ottoman 
envoys quasi-captivity appeared to be a Habsburg strategy to eradicate their 
responsibility in case the war continued. After forty months residence in Habsburg 
land, Zülfikar and Mavrocordato finally made their way back home.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
The first question that arises from this inconclusive peace attempt should seek 
the meaning and motivation behind intransigent and uncompromising manners of 
both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs. The answer is hidden in the zeitgeist. When 
considered within sovereignty perception of the time, according to which “the single 
and most distinctive feature of Europe was that almost everywhere wealth and 
prestige were based on the ownership of land,”1 early modern monarchs’ devotion 
to expand their territorial sphere of influence – sometimes to a degree that may only 
be called blind commitment - should not astonish the historian.  
In a very long process that might be expanded well into the mid-twentieth 
century, gaining new territories and geographically expanding a state’s area of 
influence and authority has been a major goal of statesmen. In the end, Zülfikar, 
who unyieldingly followed the order given to him by the Palace, was a character of 
the early modern world, where valor and resoluteness against enemy- be it on the 
battlefield or in a peace negotiation – was a usual and respectable way of expressing 
strategies and policies for every state. At a time when the entire Europe was under 
pressure of the mostly hyperbolic ambitions of monarchs and rulers of all sizes, one 
                                                 
1
 Black, The Rise of the European Powers ,  2. 
 75
should not be surprised to see that the Ottomans and Habsburgs remained 
determined to fulfill their aspirations. In Zülfikar’s case, a good example to that 
mindset was his solid opposition to abandoning Transylvania.2 Once brought under 
the Sultan’s control, the tributary situation of East European princes should have 
been maintained. An observation by a contemporary, Paul Rycaut, of Ottoman 
control on Eastern Europe commences with the following explanation: 
The power and puissance of an Empire is not more judged of by the many 
governors, the rich offices it can dispose of, the multitude of provinces it 
contains in obedience, and necessity it can impose on other Princes to seek 
its confederacy…then it is by the many tributaries which to redeem the 
remainder of their worldly goods, willingly sacrifice the best part to appease 
his fury, in whose power it is to matter all.3 
 
Nonetheless, the consequence of the Ottoman-Holy League war of 1683-1699 
was going to prove one more time that courage and eagerness are not the only 
prerequisites of success. What at that point astonishes the researcher, which also 
astonished a myriad number of Ottomanists until today, is Zülfikar’s explanation of 
the reasons behind existing circumstances of the Empire at that time. Zülfikar 
reiterated time and again during the talks that the Habsburgs were indebted their 
advantageous position to the turning tides of fortune.4 In other words, from 
Zülfikar’s point of view, the tide of fortunes could turn to the Ottomans any time 
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and help them recover, at the expense of the Habsburgs this time. This approach of 
Zülfikar was in a sense an indirect reflection of the contemporary Ottoman 
chroniclers' failure o understand the actual conditions of the Empire. Indeed, one 
may argue that it was not simply the tide of fortunes, but several weaknesses of the 
traditional Ottoman mentality what brought them to the threshold of total downfall, 
despite keeping pace with European counterparts in military technology and 
successful adjustment to new standards.5  
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the most glamorous figures of Central Europe,” indebted their fame to a great extent to their 
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Zülfikar, regardless of whether it was an intentional manner to compensate on 
the table what was lost on the battlefield, illustrated a reflection of the given 
misapprehension. He insisted on that the allies, too, should have considered that the 
tide of fortunes may turn against them any time. Therefore, they should have been 
temperate and reasonable in their demands if they wanted peace.6 
A similar state of mind may be observed in the intransigence of Leopold. As was 
stressed during the narration, Leopold, who for two decades from 1660s on focused 
on his western borders since he perceived Louis XIV as the greatest threat to his 
territorial integrity, meanwhile preferred complying with the conjuncture against the 
Ottomans. Because of his occupations in Western Europe, his army’s victory on the 
battlefield in 1663 was followed by a treaty (Vasvar), where the defeated Ottomans 
have left the table as the advantageous part. Later, during the 1670s, as a 
repercussion of that treaty, Hungarian malcontents permanently threatened 
Leopold’s sovereignty in the region. In fact, the Emperor’s repressive pro-Counter-
Reformation administration in the region was an important reason behind the 
uprisings in Hungary but the Ottoman Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha’s support 
to the rebels fostered the disarray even more. During all these years, he couldn’t 
                                                                                                                                        
successes against the Sultan’s armies. R. J. W. Evans, The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550-
1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 142. Throughout the war, Leopold effectively replaced and 
transferred his generals from one front to another. Meanwhile, Ottoman commanders including even 
the serdar (commander-in-chief) were continuously harassed by a “battle on a second undeclared 
front” even when they are in action, which primarily grew out of the “jealousy.”  This has been an 
impediment to presence of experienced military commanders when needed. For an elaborate 
discussion of the issue, see Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare 1500-1700 (Padstow: UCL Press, 
1999), 134-141. The bickering for positions in the Palace did not cease even at the times of 
emergency. While the preparations continued for one of the most vital campaigns in the history of 
the House of Osman, this inherent weakness of the statesmen at the Ottoman Palace emerged one 
more time. Antagonists of the Grand Vizier plotted against him to seize power by replacing the 
moribund Süleyman III with the former Sultan Mehmet IV. Having been warned by his agents about 
the conspiracy, Fazıl Mustafa Pasha forced the ill-conditioned Sultan to move to Edirne, in order to 
secure the rise of Süleyman’s younger brother Ahmet II to the throne, in case Süleyman died during 
the campaign. Expectedly, the Sultan lost his life towards the end of June. Thanks to the Grand 
Vizier’s precautions, Ahmet II (June 1691 – February 1695) ascended the throne in Edirne. Silahdar, 
Silahdar, Vol 2, 567-569. 
6
 Mustafa Güler. Zülfikar, 39. 
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cope with the situation mainly because he was constantly fighting with Louis. In 
1689, when the Ottoman envoy visited Leopold’s palace and asked about the 
possibility of signing a peace treaty or a truce, it was highly predictable that the 
Emperor would strive to take the biggest share he could take from the Ottomans. 
There wouldn’t be a better opportunity. In the spring of 1689, that is, before Fazil 
Mustafa Pasha launched the counter-offensive of the Ottomans in following 
summer, his armies marched as south as Serbia and threatened Bosnia. It seemed 
that there wasn’t any obstacle to his desire to keep all his acquisitions in case he 
concluded a treaty with the Sultan. Indeed, he had other cogent reasons too. Under 
his regime, his Empire, although facing continuous menace posed by Louis XIV, 
entered a route that ended up with the Habsburg hegemony in Europe in the first 
half of the following century, an era narrated by Austrian historians under titles such 
as “The second Habsburg Empire”7 and “An Empire Evolves and Asserts Itself.”8 
However, Leopold’s fault was dismissing his “hereditary enemy as if vanquished 
forever.”9 Whatever the circumstances were, it would be a too fantastic idea to 
expect total failure of an Empire like Ottomans, which had sources that would help 
to restore the power of the Sultan under the administration of able statesmen. Fazil 
Mustafa Pasha, although benefiting from Louis’s declaration of war, attested this 
fact only in two years. Colin Heywood epitomized the situation in his following 
words: 
…peace was not attainable in the east…because none of the combatants, 
more specifically, neither Austria nor the Ottomans, wanted it. At Vienna, 
Leopold and his advisors were committed to – and believed they could win – 
a double war on two fronts, and refused until a late stage – 1698 in fact – the 
proffered Anglo-Dutch mediation. At the Porte and equally war party 
believed, incorrectly as it turned out, that the lost provinces in Hungary 
                                                 
7
 Charles Ingaro, The Habsburg Monarchy, 105. 
8
 Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 54. 
9
 Ivan Parvev, Habsburgs and Ottomans, 97. 
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could eventually be regained, and peace eventually be made on their terms, 
as long as France remained at war with emperor.10 
 
Consequently, despite the strengthening pro-peace parties in Europe, the 
zeitgeist of time united with the peculiarities of the interaction between the 
Ottomans and the Habsburgs and did not let them sign the treaty in 1689. The peace 
treaty took approximately another decade to be signed. 
In addition, according to Heywood, the English mediation during Zülfikar 
Efendi’s presence in Vienna marked the beginning of preservative English policy on 
the Ottoman Empire. 
…the course of English diplomacy during these years retained its 
significance as marking the initiation of what may be termed as classic mode 
(redemptive; conservative; preservative) of English foreign policy regarding 
the Ottoman Empire, a policy which came to its full flowering only in the 
mid-nineteenth century.11 
 
      Indeed, despite the fact that the English had interests in the Levant at that time, 
in the early 1690s French aggression has been more determinant that any other 
factor for English to mediate between the Sultan and the Emperor. 
A last point should be made in regard to what this mission of Zülfikar in Vienna 
and the dynamism it triggered in Europe meant within time’s diplomatic frame. The 
study proved one more time that the end of seventeenth century marked a very 
important stage of the transformation in the European states system of the time. A 
dense network of diplomatic relations, which accompanied to Zülfikar’s presence in 
Vienna, was a peculiarity of the post-Westphalian diplomatic environment in 
European politics.12 From the 1650s on, every single political entity in Europe was 
integrated into this system more than ever, bringing about a truly international 
network and a political structure, in which the monarchs’ strategies and decision-
                                                 
10
 Colin Heywood, “Work in Progress?: William III,” ? 
11
 Colin Heywood, “An Undiplomatic Anglo-Dutch,” 62. 
12
 For an articulate discussion, see Jeremy Black, The Rise of the European Powers, 1-6.  
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making were inevitably under sway of the alliances and adversaries that they are a 
part of. True, alliances and adversaries were always a feature of the inter-
monarchial engagements in history. The significance of the 1680s, nonetheless, is 
the magnified reverberations of the continuously shifting interactions on the 
political environment of the era, an era that started gaining its peculiarities after the 
peace of Westphalia. Synchronous involvement of the Ottomans, Habsburgs, 
Venetians, Poles, English, Dutch, French and Russians (later in 1690s), in this 
network supports the argument. Zülfikar’s visit to Vienna in 1689 was a small but 
remarkable element of this picture of the late seventeenth century of Europe. 
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